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ABSTRACT
The Hundred Years War was a series of conflicts from 1337 to 1453 waged
between the House of Plantagenet of England and the House of Valois of France. This thesis will
analyze the affect that the Hundred Years War had on the societies of both England and France,
and in doing so will show that the war was a catalyst for bringing England and France out of
what is recognized as the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance and Early Modern Period. The
thesis will do this by looking at three sections of English and French society: the royalty and
nobility who commanded and who arguably started the war, the soldiers and mercenary
companies who fought the war, and the non-combatants who either contributed to the war or
were affected by it in positive or negative ways. The evolution in the power and role of the
monarchs will be analyzed, while the nobility will be analyzed in their capacity as the leaders
during the war and how their station in society was affected by the war. Analysis of those that
served and fought in the war are of equal importance, as the Hundred Years War saw the rise of
paid professional armies comprised mostly of the peasantry. Mercenary companies will also be
looked at, especially in France where they contributed much to pillaging and acts of violence
against the people. While the experiences of the combatants are important to understanding the
history of the war, the experiences of those that did not directly engage in the war is important to
understanding how the war affected society as a whole. Those peasants whose farms were
destroyed by raiding armies, mercenaries, or bandits suffered greatly because of the war. Yet
some, such as merchants, profited from the war and became greatly enriched. The church and its
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role in attempting to mediate and bring peace, while others of the cloth served as outlets of
propaganda in support of their kingdom, will also be looked at in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Hundred Years War was a series of conflicts from 1337 to 1453 waged between the
House of Plantagenet of England and the House of Valois of France over the throne of France.
The roots of this conflict stretch back to the Norman conquest of England in 1066, as the King of
England was now also the Duke of Normandy, and thus was a vassal to the King of France,
which resulted in a conflict between the two monarchs as the French kings attempted to rein in
their English counterpart and reduce the French land held by said English monarch. A more
direct reason came after the death of Charles IV of France in 1328, when England’s Edward III
claimed a right to the French throne through his mother Isabella. This claim was rejected in favor
of Philip VI of the House of Valois. Edward III reluctantly acknowledged and paid homage to
Philip VI for nine years, but after Philip’s interference with Edward’s war with Scotland and his
confiscation of Aquitaine, Edward reasserted his claim to the French throne. Edward and an
invasion fleet sailed across the English Channel in 1340, destroying the defending French fleet in
the Battle of Sluys, which marked the opening battle to what would come to be known as the
Hundred Years War.
In 1346, Edward mounted a more substantial invasion, landing in Normandy and
marching through France pillaging and burning rather than attempting to hold territory in an
effort to demoralize the populace, deny anything useful to the enemy, and subverting the
authority of Philip. But in August of 1346, Philip forced a confrontation with Edward in what is
called the Battle of Crecy. The Battle of Crecy was a triumph for the English, and it served as a
proving ground for their longbow men, signaling their rise in importance in the coming years of
1

the war. Edward then proceeded north and captured Calais in 1347, which remained in English
hands throughout the rest of the war and served as a useful strategic asset for keeping troops in
northern France.
A third English invasion, this time under the command of Edward III’s son, Edward the
Black Prince, was launched from Gascony in 1356. It was during this invasion that the Battle of
Poitiers was fought. English archers once again proved their worth in this battle, stopping a
French cavalry charge and greatly aiding in the ability of the English army to gain ground. It was
also during this battle that the French king John II was captured. John was held for ransom, and it
seemed that the throne of France was all but won. John’s capture and the ransom paid for his
release would have a profound impact on the war and the French monarchy for years to come.
The final English invasion of the first phase of the war was largely unsuccessful,
especially when compared to previous campaigns. Failing to take either Reims or Paris, and after
several unforeseen circumstances that hindered the English ability to fight, Edward consented to
negotiating with the French and accepted the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360. The terms of the treaty
included that Edward renounce his claim to the throne of France in exchange for increased land
in Aquitaine.
Following a dispute over the implementation of a hearth tax by the Black Prince in
Aquitaine, France’s King Charles V summoned the Black Prince to Paris, to which the Black
Prince responded that he would only come with an army behind him. In 1369, Charles declared
war and that all English possessions in France were confiscated, and Edward III once again
claimed the title of King of France. This phase of the war went poorly for the English, largely
due to the fact that Edward III was elderly and in poor health, and the Black Prince was deathly
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ill. The Black Prince died in 1376, with his father dying the next year, and the crown went to
Edward III’s young grandson Richard II. Richard was a particularly disliked king, and his reign
faced many difficulties, such as the 1381 Peasant Revolt. The war continued to go poorly as
England’s holdings in France were slowly reduced, largely thanks to the French commander
Bertrand du Guesclin, a man of a relatively humble background who rose to prominence thanks
to his skill and recognition of merit, traits which would become more important for both
kingdoms as the war went on. The war continued to grow in unpopularity in England, largely due
to the expenses it caused, and a peace was reached in 1389 with the Treaty of Bruges.
In between the second and third phases of the war, the monarchs of England and France
suffered some of the worst threats brought against them during the entirety of the conflict.
Richard II, unpopular for his perceived military weakness, was overthrown and replaced by his
cousin Henry of Bolingbroke, who became Henry IV in 1399. In France, Charles VI was falling
into insanity while John of Burgundy and Louis of Orleans engaged in an open conflict for
power in the wake of the king’s weakness. This culminated in the Burgundian occupation forces
in 1418.
England under Henry V took advantage of Charles’s weakness and the unstable political
situation in France to form an alliance with the Burgundians in preparation for another attempt to
claim the throne of France. In 1415, Henry sailed from England with an invasion force and after
taking the city of Harfleur, conducted a raiding campaign but was forced into a confrontation
with French forces. This was the Battle of Agincourt, where an outnumbered English force
achieved victory through its superior use of archers against the mounted knights of the French.
From 1417 to 1419, Henry retook Normandy and in 1419 he established a formal alliance with
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the Duchy of Burgundy, which had by this time taken control of Paris. Henry met with Charles
VI in 1420, where the Treaty of Troyes was established, which allowed for Henry to marry
Charles’s daughter Catherine and for Henry’s heirs to inherit the throne of France.
However, Charles VI’s son, Charles VII, fought against this and sought to retake his right
as the heir and King of France. Initially, the war to reclaim this right did not go well for Charles
VII, who lost several battles to English forces and saw morale plummeting. This reversed with
the famous victory of Joan of Arc at the Siege of Orleans in 1429, raising morale and turning the
tide of the war against the English. This paved the way for Charles to march into Reims, where
he was officially crowned as Charles VII. Following Joan’s execution by the English in 1431, the
war took a more dramatic turn against the English, and in 1435 the Burgundians abandoned the
English and swore loyalty to Charles VII, returning Paris to him the same year. Charles was able
to centralize the state, reorganizing the army into a professional permanent army controlled by
the state rather than a temporary force raised by feudal ties. With this army, Charles was able to
successfully take Normandy in 1450, and in 1453, at the Battle of Castillon, French forces won a
decisive victory that finally pushed the English out of most of France and ended what historians
recognize as the Hundred Years War.
Lasting for over a century, this war had an undeniable impact on the lives of the people of
both England and France and helped to shape and alter the two societies, bringing them out of
the Middle Ages and into the next period of history. This thesis will analyze this impact and how
exactly the societies of England and France were changed as a result of the war and the
consequences associated with its progress. To do this, I will look at the three areas of society that
both engaged in and were affected by the war.
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The first area of society that will be analyzed is the monarchy and the nobility of both
kingdoms. This thesis will examine the evolution of the monarchies of England and France as
they underwent some of their most difficult challenges, how their authority gradually solidified,
and how the institutions of both kingdoms evolved to reflect what they would become in the 17th
and 18th centuries as a result of the war. In addition to the monarchs of England and France, the
nobility and their shifting role within society will also be discussed. The thesis will look at how
the nobility evolved from leading the war as chivalrous mounted knights to serving the king and
state within administrative positions in the wake of new military technology, tactics, and the
increasing importance of archers, infantry, and artillery over the cavalry that had been the
domain of the nobility. This would serve as the foundation for the centralized states that would
soon replace the feudal kingdoms of the Medieval period, and also brings up the next area of
society that will be discussed, that being the soldiers that fought the war.
To begin with, this section will examine how the institution of the army itself changed
over the course of the war. It will examine how the army was assembled, organized, and utilized
in times of both peace and war, and how it would be used after the end of the Hundred Years
War itself. Next, the leadership of the army will be discussed. Specifically, the thesis will be
examining how merit came to take precedence over pedigree, and how those of comparatively
low birth to other nobles came to be the most important leaders of the army. Following this, the
common soldiers themselves will then be analyzed, focusing on how the soldier went from being
a temporary position in times of need into a full-fledged profession, as well as how the common
soldier became a much more vital aspect of the war effort. Lastly, mercenary companies and
their effects on both the war and the societies of England and France will be looked at.
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Specifically, they will be analyzed for how they contributed to the progress of the war, and how
they served as a menace to the people that inhabited the kingdoms, especially France, due to the
growing importance of war and soldiering as a profession. The destruction caused by
mercenaries, as well as soldiers, was but one aspect of the war felt by the countless noncombatants that will be examined in the next section.
In the final chapter, the non-combatants of the war will be examined, focusing on how
they both contributed to and were affected by the war, as well as how these affects served to
transform society as the war continued and even after it ended. Those that were affected
negatively by the war will be the first to be examined, as their suffering through pillaged or
confiscated property, unbearable taxes, or a myriad of other painful consequences of war
doubtlessly sowed the seeds of discontent that often leads to change, sometimes in the form of
violent uprisings. After this, those that willingly contributed to the war, as well as those that
benefitted from it, will be looked at. The thesis will look at how the increasing usage of people of
various professions that could aid in the war made a more militarized society, as well as a more
politically aware society that increasingly used their investment and contribution to the war,
whether through services or taxes, to demand more rights. The church and its contribution to the
war, sometimes as a negotiator of peace and other times as a source of propaganda, will also be
analyzed. The concluding section will seek to examine the evolution of a sense of national
conscience and nationalism that developed as a result of the war.
Regarding sources, the majority of primary sources for this thesis will come from the
writings of Jean le Bel, Enguerrand de Monstrelet, and especially Jean Froissart. In addition to
these, a variety of other primary sources will be provided by Christopher Allmand in his book
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Society at War: The Experience of England and France During the Hundred Years War. As for
secondary sources, the bulk of information will come from the above mentioned Society at War,
along with Christopher Allmand’s other book The Hundred Years War: England and France at
War, David Green’s The Hundred Years War: A People’s History, Richard Kaeuper’s Chivalry
and Violence in Medieval Europe, and several other supplementary secondary sources. One
limitation that this thesis faces that should be mentioned is that there are few primary sources
that are directly attributed to common soldiers or peasants, or at least there are few that can be
confirmed to come from such sources. The majority of the primary sources are written by, focus
on, or are told with bias toward the nobility, and thus must be examined with care in order to
achieve a full understanding of society during this time and the changes it faced as a result of the
war. Also, it should be noted that while this thesis argues that the Hundred Years War was a
catalyst for great change within English and French society, there were other circumstances and
events during that time period that may also have contributed to societal change. Chief among
these is the Black Plague, which had caused widespread depopulation that in turn led to higher
wages and a consciousness among the common people to demand greater rights. Regardless, this
thesis will seek to argue that the Hundred Years War and the actions undertaken to fight it were
the primary cause of this change in the two societies.
Analyzing the Hundred Years War as an agent of change within Medieval society is not
new to historians. The antiquarian Joseph Hunter in 1852 wrote a pamphlet on the character of
Robin Hood, which will be examined further in this thesis, which described his tale as popular
among the common people by the reign of Edward III and beyond, and served to reflect the shift
of society’s view of a hero from the chivalrous knight to the common man armed with the bow
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that the soldiers of England had become so famed for, as well as reflecting some of the
discontent felt by the people during the war. Much more recently, Christopher Allmand’s Society
at War looks very closely at the war, what its justifications were, how it was organized, led, and
fought, and how it affected those who fought and the civilians who didn’t. In many ways,
Allmand is also analyzing how the war affected multiple areas of society and changed the
kingdoms of England and France as a whole, and in many ways this thesis is complimented and
supported by Allmand’s research. The most recent secondary source included in this thesis,
David Green’s A People’s History, also serves to support the argument made in this thesis. Green
opens his book by stating that “The reach of government, the role of the monarch, the place of
the Church, the relationships between rich and poor, noble and ignoble, and the very identities of
both nations were refashioned by more than a century of war,” and goes on to describe the period
that saw the Hundred Years War as one of “vital, vibrant, brutal change.” Thus, the argument
that the Hundred Years War was a catalyst for societal change has been discussed and supported
by historians for many years, and this thesis will attempt to contribute and support that argument
through its analysis of three specific areas of society.
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CHAPTER 2: THE KING AND THE NOBILITY
The Hundred Years War saw a change in both the monarchy and the nobility of the
English and the French. In their own ways, the monarchies of England and France became
stronger and more solidified within their respective countries, each taking on a clearly defined
and recognized aspect within society, which would evolve into the 17th and 18th century concepts
of England as a constitutional monarchy that was limited by the Parliament, and France as an
absolute monarchy. In this way, the King of England was beginning to be seen as part of the
political community, answerable to the laws that governed his kingdom, while the King of
France began to be seen as possessing a divine right to rule, given to him by God, and was
therefore above the law itself. Both monarchies also began exercising more power over the state
as a whole, most notably in the creation of an army which was raised, not through feudal
obligation, but through contracts and payment, which allowed the king to be at its head and thus
increase his power. This war also served to alter the military expectations and roles of the
monarchs of the two realms, transforming them from chivalrous knights that fought on the front
lines to leaders who delegated the fighting to those more qualified, or at least those that would
bring victory. The king was not the only one who was losing his chivalric, knightly demeanor.
The knights themselves saw their dominance on the battlefield reduced as mounted combat
became increasingly ineffective against infantry that were better trained and equipped than they
had been in previous centuries. Advances in other weapons, such as artillery, in addition to an
overall change in tactics as the war progressed, further reduced the importance of the mounted
knights. The almost religiously important concepts of valor, prowess, and chivalry that the
knightly class, and by extension the noble class, used to distinguish and define themselves was

9

thus put in jeopardy, as there was less opportunity for the nobility to prove that they possessed
these traits through battle. Because of this, the nobility had to seek other areas in which they
could distinguish themselves. This came in the form of serving the crown in law and
administration of their kingdoms and, in the case of England at least, of the newly conquered
territories. The nobility began to see service in these areas in society as equally acceptable to
service in combat in order to prove their worth and justify their existence, and eventually the
concept of seeking glory in battle that had been a staple of chivalry and knighthood gave way to
serving the country for the collective good. The military became part of this concept of the
common good, and thus merit and experience gained an advantage over bloodline when it came
to positions of authority.
Kings
This war saw five English kings and five French kings battle one another for the throne of
France, and the war had a profound impact on the monarchies of both kingdoms that served to
strengthen them and define their roles within their respective nations. This is not to say that the
war was entirely beneficial or even friendly to the monarchies of England and France, nor that
this change was painless. This was a period in which monarchs of both kingdoms were placed
under a great amount of strain, as kings both shaped and were shaped by the conflict. This war
witnessed and led to the deposition of three English kings (Richard II being deposed in 1399, and
Henry VI and Richard III being deposed in 1461 and 1485 respectively as a result of the Wars of
the Roses which were caused by dissatisfaction felt with the English monarchy at the end of the
Hundred Years War) and saw a mad Charles VI nearly destroy France. 1 Both kingdoms saw their

1

David Green, The Hundred Years War: A People’s History, (London: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 104.
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monarchs undergo challenges to their authority and even have that authority taken away with the
king being supplanted by some form of usurper.
England’s Richard II was considered by many a disappointment compared to his
militarily successful grandfather Edward III, and grew in unpopularity throughout his reign,
spending lavishly on court life and entertainment and effectively ruling without a Parliament.
This culminated in his deposition by his cousin Henry Bolingbroke, who was crowned Henry
IV.2 Henry VI also suffered from unpopularity due to his perceived weakness in seeking peace
and was blamed for the territorial losses in France, which in part caused the uprising known as
Cade’s Rebellion in 1450.3 His unpopularity and the ultimate loss of the war during his reign
would contribute to the beginning of the civil war know as the Wars of the Roses and his
deposition by Edward IV.
In France, when the kingdom had come under the rule of Charles VI, the king seemed to
be slowly slipping into madness. Froissart describes this madness, relating it to the Biblical King
Nebuchadnezzar, and claiming that he had drawn his sword and wildly began swinging at his
pages and nobles.4 As his madness continued, the Duke of Orleans took control of the court and
effectively ruled France in the king’s stead. Both of these instances show an increasing threat to
royal authority as the war continued, albeit with each country treating an unpopular king in
different ways.
But despite these setbacks and challenges, this period marked a time of strengthening
royal power and a change in the relationship between ruler and ruled within the two nations.
2

Jean Froissart, Peter Thompson (trans. and ed.), “Chronicles of Jean Froissart”, from Contemporary Chronicles of
the Hundred Years War: From the Works of Jean le Bel, Jean Froissart, and Enguerrand de Monstrelet, (The Folio
Society Ltd, 1966), p. 247.
3
Green, The Hundred Years War, 62.
4
Froissart, “Chronicles,” 218-219.
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Even the coronation and anointing ceremony gives a glimpse at the changes within the
monarchies and the differences between French and English kings. In France, the coronation of a
king was far more than just a political act, as it was “little less than a beatification,” granting the
king almost divine status within his realm. 5 The coronation gave the king spiritual authority, and
in addition to the close relationship that France had long had with the ecclesiastical community,
the French king was seen more like a Christian Roman emperor, with all the unrestricted power
that such a title would entail. This laid the foundation for what would be the absolutism that
defined the French monarchy in the early modern era. In contrast, English kings were never seen
as having this image of divine rule, though not for lack of trying. This limited the power of
English kingship, and the oath taken by English kings of this period clearly reflects this. A part
of the oath states that the king must “maintain and keep the laws and rightful customs which the
community of the realm shall choose, and defend and enforce them to the honour of God, to the
best of his ability.”6 This implied that a new and different contract had been formed between the
king and the people, an expansion of what constituted the “community of the realm,” and that the
king was now answerable to his people. 7 While it is unlikely that the English kings of the
Hundred Years War gave much thought to the peasantry, this oath was a step towards realizing
the importance of a widening political community that would begin to emerge and express itself
as the war progressed. The continuing conflict also required the creation of a “war state,” which
built on earlier constitutional foundations to create “a realm in which the king was bound by the
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Green, The Hundred Years War, 109.
Green, The Hundred Years War, 109.
7
Green, The Hundred Years War, 110.
6
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law and ruled with the assent of Parliament.”8 This did not mean that the English king was
weaker than his French counterpart however, as the support of Parliament provided the king with
substantial resources, but it did create a political structure in which the king operated within the
law rather than above it.9 For the French king, who possessed both legal rights and divine
authority, there was protection against rebellion and deposition at least in theory, as those that
opposed the will of the king would be labeled as sacrilegious and thus the monarchy was
generally not threatened within its own territory. The English king, as has been shown, did not
have this protection because he was not viewed as holy but instead, while at the apex of the
political community, was an intrinsic part of it and subject to its principles, and therefore also
subject to the punishment for violating those principles. 10 Two Frenchmen commented on this
difference in the views of a king and the loyalty he is owed. Jean Juvenal des Ursins wrote in
1444, “They have a way in England of not thinking twice about changing their kings when it
seems convenient, to kill them or evilly bring about their death,” and forty years later, Jean de
Rely commented that the deposing of their king was “something which the good and loyal
people of France have never done.”11 The fact is, however, that the English are not disloyal to
their king, as literature of the time will attest to. The story of Robin Hood, believed to have been
written during the reign of Edward III, describes the titular character famed for robbing corrupt
nobility as extremely loyal to his king. Upon hearing that the king has invited Robin to an
audience in Nottingham, Robin expresses that “I love no man in all the worlde so well as I do my
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Green, The Hundred Years War, 118
Green, The Hundred Years War, 119.
10
Green, The Hundred Years War, 113.
11
Kenneth Fowler, The Age of Plantagenet and Valois: The Struggle for Supremacy 1328-1498, (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1967), p. 29.
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kynge,” and upon meeting him kneels in acknowledgement and asks for his mercy. 12 This
perfectly reflects the differences in perceptions of loyalty and kingship between the two
countries. The French are loyal to their king as they are loyal to their faith, as the king represents
this faith and is in many ways akin to the pope, while the English are loyal to the king so long as
he upholds and obeys the laws that he represents.
The importance of the king in society can be seen throughout the war, including in the
military strategies used to fight it. The primary strategy used in the early stages of the war, that
of the chevauchees, or raids which entailed the pillaging and burning of enemy territory, was an
attack against royal authority. This strategy was meant to target the king as well as his land,
undermining his power and authority by violently showing that he cannot fulfill one of his
primary roles as a king, that being to protect his people from attacks. 13 The English under
Edward III used this strategy to great effect in the beginning stages of the war. Reims, the
traditional coronation city of the kings of France, was targeted twice during the war because of
its importance in the crowning of kings. It was first attacked in the first phase of the war, when
Edward III and one of the largest and best equipped English expeditionary forces to date laid
siege to it in 1359. This was after the capture of France’s John II at Poitiers, so Edward may have
been galvanized by this and his previous victories to the point where he believed he could take
the city and secure the French throne. The siege failed however, putting a halt to English
ambitions for a time. Reims was also the target of Joan of Arc in 1429, and was at that time
controlled by Burgundian forces. However, after the French victory at Patay in the same year, the
12

Joseph Hunter, The Great Hero of the Ancient Minstrelsy of England, “Robin Hood.” His Period, Real Character,
etc. Investigated and perhaps Ascertained, (London: Tucker, Frith Street, Soho Square, 1852), p. 34.
13
Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War 1300-1450, (Cambridge University
Press, 1988), p. 55.
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city was able to be taken by the French and allowed for Charles VII to be crowned King of
France. 14 It can be argued that it was the taking of Reims and the subsequent coronation of
Charles VII that boosted the morale of French forces and aided in their ultimate victory in the
war, clearly showing the importance of the role and ceremony of kingship.
Coronation of English kings was no less important to the nation and to the war effort.
Following the death of Edward III, Froissart writes that “England could not be long without a
sovereign, and that it would be good for the whole kingdom that they should as soon as possible
have [Richard] crowned.”15 As the English were preparing to crown Richard, French forces had
begun raiding the coast, and Froissart writes that the people were declaring that “’We must
hasten to crown our king, and then set off against these French before they do further
damage.’”16 This reflects just how important the office of king was at this time, as retaliation
against the French seemed to almost require it before proceeding, even if the king was young and
soon to be unpopular.
The Hundred Years War saw the monarchs of England and France acquire an important
power, that being the right to raise a permanent and general taxation. In France, the financial
demands of the war greatly extended the demands the king could make upon his country.
Perhaps the most crucial incident that contributed to this was the ransom that was needed to pay
for the captured John II, which led to a tax that was made permanent over a period of years, even
in peace time, to meet the demands of the ransom and the war in general. 17 In addition to the
ransom, the period of 1359-1369 saw Companies, mercenary bands, ravage the countryside of
14

Green, The Hundred Years War, 110.
Froissart, “Chronicles,” 174.
16
Froissart, “Chronicles,” 175.
17
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 104.
15
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France. These attacks resulted in the need to raise funds required to build defenses, and required
the king’s permission to do so.18 This regular raising of funds for defense against mercenaries, in
addition to raising money to go towards the royal ransom and support of the war, made people
grow accustomed to permanent taxation and even considered them as meant for the public good.
Later, under Charles VII, this practice was continued and can be seen in the tax known as “the
Fourth,” which placed taxes on the sale of wine for the benefit of “the royal purse.”19 The case
in England was much the same, as from 1362 to 1369, Parliament continuously voted to continue
a tax on wool that was meant to raise funds for defenses in Calais and Aquitaine and to “save the
king’s estate and honour”.20 In both countries, the king began to gain the power to implement a
permanent tax, even in peace time, for the public good as well as his own power.
Another way in which the Hundred Years War strengthened the monarchies of both
kingdoms is that it saw the creation of a permanent national army that the king was able to
control directly. Building on the military improvements of John II, the establishment of a stable
tax system, the military requirements of the war, and the support of a large percentage of the
nobility, Charles V was able to create a permanent army that was centralized and organized by
the king’s officials. 21 Granted, this permanent army did not survive his death and it was not until
the reign of Charles VII that a permanent army under the king’s command was created once
again. This began in the mid-1440s when Charles VII organized major reforms with the intent of
asserting the right of the king to appoint military commanders and to make the army an
18

Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 105.
Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Peter Thomson (trans. and ed.), “The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet”, from
Contemporary Chronicles of the Hundred Years War: From the Works of Jean le Bel, Jean Froissart, and
Enguerrand de Monstrelet, (The Folio Society Ltd, 1966), p. 344.
20
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 105.
21
Green, The Hundred Years War, 133.
19
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instrument of the state controlled by the king. 22 In addition to appointing commanders and
raising troops through contracts between the king and his captains, the kings of both England and
France became an integral part of the new national army through providing weapons, including
artillery that was almost exclusively held by the king. 23 The king was able to maintain control of
the army through economic sanctions, as reflected in the system of muster and review of
soldiers. A 1424 set of orders for an English commander state that a review of soldiers was
necessary to ensure that they were properly equipped and disciplined, and must be carried out
“[with the intention of] bringing these into the obedience of our lord the king.”24
This creation of an army under the king’s control, in contrast to the past where defense
was generally a local matter, made it to where the king came to be seen as the protector of the
entire realm, and he must be consulted with all matters related to its defense. An incident in
Dieppe in 1440 reflects this, as the people there sought permission from Charles VII before
issuing a tax meant to pay for the town’s fortifications, emphasizing that they would not do so
without his permission. 25 Thus, local defense was seen in a wider context of the defense of the
country as a whole, and should be controlled by the crown. This development, in addition to the
creation of a national army, meant that war was becoming a matter of state.
While both English and French kings made it a point to be at the head of the rising
national armies, this period saw a change in the definition of a king when it came to engaging in
battle, at least for the French. Prior to the Hundred Years War, and even at its beginning, a king
22
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would be judged by his prowess in battle and his skill as a knight. Chivalric literature such as
The Marvels of Rigomer portray a good king as being a brave and noble knight, and indeed in
war a king was a knight as well as a king and thus shared in the practice of chivalry. 26 The
chivalric idea of valor had been central to what made a good king, and thus a prosperous nation.
Going through Biblical and classical texts, Froissart lists cities and civilizations such as Nineveh,
Jerusalem, the Persian Empire, and the Roman Empire, claiming that “valour” moved from one
to the other, leading not only to their creation but also to their prosperity and continuation. 27 He
goes on to explain that “valour” had come to England during the reign of Edward III, the
chivalric deeds of him and his son, Edward the Black Prince, having brought it into England
where it may aid them against France, or it may return to France as it once did. 28 This concept of
“valour,” and of the necessity of the king to possess it, reflects the beginning stages of the war
where the king was closely associated with knighthood, chivalry, and the honorable combat that
those entail.
But as the war continued, this view began to change. In France, which had long been on
the losing side of the war, national military success became far more important to the people than
the king’s own personal prowess. John II’s capture at the Battle of Poitiers and its ramifications
were still fresh in the minds of the French, and in a war where infantry and missile weapons were
proving more effective against chivalrous mounted knights, the risk of the king being on the
front lines of the battlefield was recognized as being too great, and thus it was acceptable for him
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not to participate directly in order to simply prove his skill. 29 The court author of Charles VI,
Christine de Pizan, even made it a point to state that the military successes of Charles V were not
compromised by his limited personal involvement, and emphasized prudence over prowess as
the key virtue of kingship.30 By the time of the reign of Charles VII, bravery and skill in battle
were no longer requirements for the French throne, nor were they required in order to be
perceived as a good king even in times of war, as his title of “The Victorious” demonstrates.
England, however, maintained its view that a true king must prove himself through skill
and victory in battle. Failure in military ventures or perceived passivity helped lead to the
deposition of English kings during the war. Both Richard II and Henry VI show how perceived
weakness and lack of military skill can lead to loss of respect and authority within England, even
leading to the deposition of a king. By contrast, kings like Edward III and Henry V were
respected greatly for their military successes and were able to use this to further their authority
both at home and abroad.31 The writing of this period also reflects this, as Froissart, Chandos
Herald, and Thomas Walsingham all placed great value on the martial prowess of the king. 32
While other writers, such as John Gower, saw the main role of the king as “governor not
warrior,” this seems to be the opinion of the minority. 33
But even if chivalry and the concepts of knighthood deteriorated to the point where the
king did not engage in direct combat, it was still a useful tool to gain power. The concept of
chivalry was a prime way of luring men into fighting for and serving the king, and the founding
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of chivalric orders like John II’s Order of the Star and Edward III’s Order of the Garter were
created to serve the purposes of the monarch that founded them and their successors. 34 The Order
of the Star specifically, despite it not lasting long following the defeat and capture of John II,
was intended to bind the French nobility to the Valois monarchy and its knights were not
permitted to be a part of any other order.35 In the later stages of the war, as reforms were being
undergone for the creation of a permanent army under the king’s command, the chivalric search
for glory was redirected into service toward the king, who “represented the public good and
honour of a nation or people.”36 Chivalry thus began to take on a slightly different meaning, one
in which those that practiced it were servants to the ruler, and this only continued as the war
progressed and the nobility came to be seen as acting protectors of society. 37 This allowed for
greater control over the nobility and greater power for the king.
By the end of the war, the monarchies of England and France had a clear distinction in
that the English king was still at least in part defined by chivalry and knightly prowess while the
French king was defined by religion and sacramentalism. But just as the king had to undergo a
change in what chivalry and knighthood meant for him, the knights of the nobility too had to
cope with a change in their worldview and concept of chivalry.
Knights and Nobles
The Hundred Years War saw a change in the role of the nobility, which had long held
dominant positions on the battlefield as mounted cavalry. For the nobility, chivalry and
knighthood had long been vital to their identity and behavior. In chivalric literature such as
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Lancelot do Lac, prowess is given credit as the originator of nobility, as the strong and the
valorous were needed to combat evil once it had entered the world.38 Two centuries later,
Froissart would echo this when he wrote “as firewood cannot burn without flame, neither can a
gentleman achieve perfect honor nor worldly renown without prowess.” Jean Froissart also wrote
that “just as the four Evangelists and the Twelve Apostles are nearer to Our Lord than all others,
so are valiant Knights nearer to Honour held in higher esteem than all other men.” 39 He reasons
that this is because knights, and therefore nobility, win honorable titles through honorable
combat and are thus rightly superior to other men. Chivalry, prowess, and honor were all linked
in the minds of the nobility, as the practice of one produces the others. Chivalry was the honor of
the nobility, and that honor was earned and protected through prowess in violence and combat.40
Perhaps even more than that, chivalry and the concept of prowess became almost like a religion,
virtually worshipped by those that practiced it. Froissart says that Edward the Black Prince, just
prior to the battle at Najera in 1367, uttered a prayer to God: “True, sovereign Father, who hast
made and created us, as truly as Thou dost know that I am not come here save for the
maintenance of right, and for prowess and nobility which urge and incite me to gain a life of
honor, I beseech Thee that Thou wilt this day giard me and my men.” 41
In this prayer, the Black Prince looks to God as a supporter, perhaps even the father, of
prowess and honor, indicating the almost religious fervor that chivalry and its associated
concepts inspired. All of the nobility, no matter how different in wealth or standing they may
have been, were united by their shared dedication to chivalry and their ability to fight as mounted
38

Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 130.
Froissart, “Chronicles”, 89.
40
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 8.
41
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 52.
39

21

knights.42 Thus, since conflict was a prime means of attaining honor through prowess, war was
seen as the greatest chivalric opportunity. The mid-14th century French warrior and theoretician
Geoffroi de Charny even declared war as the ultimate chivalric enterprise. 43 For the nobility, war
and conflict justified their existence as a privileged class just as chivalry and prowess did. Even
this war at its outset was shaped by the concepts associated with knighthood, such as demands of
honor, demonstrations of prowess, and demands of loyalty. 44 The first phase of the war, as
chronicled by Froissart, very much seemed to focus on the acts of the knightly nobility. Froissart
wrote that “Many gallant deeds of arms were performed, many knights and squires on each side
were unhorsed and then pushed back into the saddle,” making the war sound much more like a
tournament than an actual war.45 This is seen again when Froissart is describing the Battle of
Poitiers, writing that “There you could see a great assemblage of the finest armour, of rich
blazonry, banners and pennons, and noble knights and squires, for all the flower of French
chivalry was there,” again making the war seem more akin to a tournament filled with pageantry
and performance than a war.46
But as the war progressed, the knighthood saw their importance on the battlefield
significantly reduced. It came to be seen that success in battle depended on infantry, archers, and
eventually gunpowder artillery, rather than the once overwhelming mounted aristocracy. 47 It
should first be noted however, that mounted cavalry was not completely made useless by this
war. The early stages of the war saw the use of the chevauchees with great effect, and there are
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records of heavy cavalry successfully defeating infantry. An example of this can be seen in an
account of the Battle of Castillon in 1453, detailing how the English lord Talbot and his mounted
men destroyed a group of four hundred French archers. 48 Nevertheless, this war would see
countless more instances where cavalry suffered crushing defeats at the hands of infantry and
ranged weapons. The first great example of this was at the first great battle of the conflict at
Crecy in 1346. Despite being tired and running low on supplies, English forces were able to
decisively defeat the French cavalry through a combination of dismounted men-at-arms and
archers, securing victory for England in the battle and causing Philip VI and his forces to flee. 49
Similar results occurred at the Battle of Poitiers in 1356 and most famously at Agincourt in 1415.
As the war progressed, mounted combat began to lose its importance and this is reflected
in the writings of Monstrelet, who never mentions the type of pageantry or knightly combat
described by Froissart early in the war and often only mentions mounted knights in the context of
being ineffective. For instance, in his description of the Battle of Agincourt, he describes how the
French knights had cut their lances in half to make them more effective and how “Most of the
[knights] and all their horses were driven back among the vanguard by fear of the English
archers,” showing not only how the weapons of mounted knights were increasingly losing
relevance but also how devastating simple archers were to cavalry. 50 Even the expensive armor
that knights proudly wore contributed to their defeat, as at the battle “this weight of armour and
the softness of the sodden earth, as has been said, held them almost immobile,” which severely
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restricted their effectiveness.51 It was after Agincourt that English military strategy shifted from
the chevauchee raids to siege warfare, further reducing the importance of knights in the overall
scheme of the war.52 It simply came to the point where chivalrous methods of warfare reduced
the efficiency of the war effort, and it simply focused too much on glory rather than results,
possibly impeding victory. 53 The focus on courage and skill in hand-to hand fighting had to give
way to more efficient methods of leadership, to true generalship and staying away from the front
lines if the nobility hoped to hold their position as military commanders.
It wasn’t just the nobility’s role as valuable cavalry that was threatened during the
Hundred Years War. Their very existence and role in society came into question, especially in
France. The nobility of France was blamed for not fulfilling its role in society of protecting the
people from enemies. In 1357, the author of De miserabili statu regni Francie, reflecting on the
loss at Poitiers, praised King John II as courageous but condemned the nobility as failures and
cowards who had failed their obligation to France. 54 This view of the nobility in having failed in
its military obligation was one of the causes of the Jacquerie revolt in 1358, which will be
discussed further in Chapter 4.55 The nobility had to find a way to prove themselves and regain
their honor, and this came in the form of service to the nation.
Other opportunities aside from direct military action were made available to the nobility
during the Hundred Years War, allowing them to serve in different ways while still maintaining
their place in society and even achieving honor. The war led to an expansion of government and
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encouraged participation in the developing bureaucracies and assemblies, which the nobility
participated in and vied for favor with the king. 56 The nobility, with their great local influence,
were vital in the role of military organization and recruitment, enlisting their tenants and
virtually anyone associated with them. 57 Service in the king’s council or, in England, Parliament
also gave ample opportunity for the nobility to contribute to the war effort and advance the cause
of their country.58 And of course, for the English at least, the conquering of new territories
required members of the nobility to act as administrators of said territories in the name of the
king. This transition was fairly easy considering that chivalric ideas were not against serving the
king loyally and in any way possible, and even if the idea of chivalry was against being paid a
wage for that service, it is doubtful that the nobility minded. 59 In the era of increasingly effective
infantry and ranged weaponry that made chivalry on the battlefield difficult, service in law and
administration were publicly acknowledged as noble and became more acceptable for the
nobility to engage in. 60
Through this service to the nation as a whole rather than personal glory, chivalry began to
give way in favor of patriotism. 61 The chivalrous knight was becoming a soldier, and honorable
single combat was abandoned in favor of a sense of fighting together as a nation in support of
said nation. In this emerging world of soldiers, the aristocracy still held on to leadership roles,
but merit and military experience was quickly becoming a far more vital requirement than
highborn descent.
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CHAPTER 3: SOLDIERS AND MERCENARIES
The Hundred Years War witnessed a change in what constituted an army, how an army
was organized, and what it meant to be a soldier. The kingdoms of England and France
reorganized their armies according to their own needs, with England creating an army that was
ready and willing to invade and conquer territory and France creating an army that was capable
of defending that territory. Both kingdoms set about replacing the feudal method of raising a
temporary army in favor of a permanent and professional force of paid soldiers with a defined
chain of command, thus turning the practice of war into an organized profession. The end result
for both kingdoms was a national standing army, although there was one distinction in that the
French army was centrally commanded by the monarch rather than through a system of
contractual obligations that defined the English indenture system. Those that led the army also
began to change during this period. As mentioned at the end of the last chapter, the militaries of
both kingdoms were beginning to recognize and promote those of proven skill to important
military commands rather than granting them these positions based purely on their noble
bloodline. While those of peasant birth rarely ascended to the heights of military command, it is
still notable that those members of the lesser nobility and even captains of mercenary bands were
elevated to such high positions because of their recognized military acumen. The ordinary
soldier, and the concept of a soldier itself, evolved as well. Again, as stated in the previous
chapter, knights and cavalry were slowly losing their importance on the battlefield during this
war. The common infantry, and especially the archer, became vital to the outcome of numerous
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battles and to victory in the war itself. The artillery and siege engines operated by non-noble
soldiers became more and more important as the war progressed, and as the two kingdoms
reorganized their armies into a permanent national force, the profession of being a soldier
developed and became a life-long career. Some of these that took the profession of soldier joined
the ranks of mercenary companies, some of which fought for one of the two kingdoms while
others operated independently and ravaged the countryside for no one’s gain but their own. The
emergence and strength of these companies reflects the political turmoil that was prevalent
during this time, especially in France, and their actions largely contributed to the non-combatant
facing the worst effects of the war.
Army Organization
The reorganization of the armies of England and France from forces raised ad hoc based
on feudal obligations to national standing armies of paid soldiers is perhaps one of the greatest
changes brought about by the Hundred Years War. The institution that was the army changed,
and various reforms and methods of organization were undertaken in order to create this new
form of permanent military. Each kingdom underwent changes that had the goal of making them
more effective in their relative positions in the war, making the English army a more effective
invading and garrisoning force and making France a more effective defensive force and
eventually a force of reconquest.
In England, the practice of raising troops by feudal levy had all but stopped, and a system
of indenture through which men would choose to serve in return for pay or reward had taken its

27

place. 62 Indentures could be either written or oral contracts, and stated the strength and rank of
the forces to be raised, specified the period and place of service, and set the rates of payment.63 A
good example of an indenture can be provided by looking at the 1397 indenture contract between
John of Gaunt and Nicholas de Atherton. The contract states that “Nicholas is retained and bound
towards the said duke [John of Gaunt], to serve him both in time of peace and in war.” 64 The
contract then goes on to specify the amount of payment per year and the stipulations for any
profits of war taken. The division of plunder was an important aspect discussed in most such
contracts, and special men known as butiniers were appointed to collect and assess the value of
taken spoils and to ensure an equitable and lawful division of spoils. 65 It is important to note that
the terms in the contract mention service in times of both war and peace, meaning that from this
form of contract a permanent force could be raised and maintained without the need for an actual
conflict. However, it should be noted that this retaining of services in times of peace could also
have been part of what has been called “bastard feudalism,” which was essentially a weak
shadow of the fading practice of feudalism, wherein a relationship based on feudal loyalties was
replaced by payment for service to a patron.66 It is also important to clarify that this contract, and
many similar indentures, is not merely limited to one man serving another, as it also includes the

62

Christopher Allmand (ed.), Society at War: England and France During the Hundred Years War, (Woodbridge:
The Boydell Press, 1998), p. 44.
63
Kenneth Fowler, The Age of Plantagenet and Valois: The Struggle for Supremacy 1328-1498, (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1967), p. 93.
64
“Indentures of Retinue with John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, enrolled in Chancery, 1367-1399,” from Allmand,
Society at War, 57.
65
Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War 1300-1450, (Cambridge University
Press, 1988), p. 128.
66
P. R. Cross, "Bastard Feudalism Revised." Past & Present, no. 125 (1989): 27.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/650860.

28

households, allies, and soldiers of both parties that are all swearing to abide by the contract and
serve or fight as requested.
The indenture mentioned above discussed the payment that Nicholas would receive, but it
was not just captains such as him that were paid. These contracts stipulated that all those in
service to the contractor, and to an extent the king, received payment. In regards to this, payment
was given based on rank. A 1424 text describes an indenture that listed the payment as “for a
knight banneret, captain of men-at-arms, four shillings sterling a day in English money; for a
knight bachelor, likewise a captain, two shillings sterling; for a mounted man-at-arms, twelve
pence sterling a day; and for each archer, six pence a day,” showing that the entire army was
under a system of payment in return for service. 67
The English also instituted the system of muster and review in order to ensure military
readiness and effectiveness, which also served as a method of maintaining control over the army
through the use of economic sanctions should the review deem the soldiers ill equipped or
disciplined. A set of orders from John, the Duke of Bedford and regent of France in the name of
Henry VI, given in 1424 describe the purpose of these musters as “bringing [the soldiers] into
obedience of our lord the king,” and ensuring that all the soldiers were properly equipped and
organized. 68 The fact that the orders stipulated that the muster and review was meant to bring
soldiers into proper obedience of the king clearly reflects the organization of an army controlled
by the state, although perhaps not as directly as the French army. This desire of the army to be
obedient to the king, and to be disciplined, was of paramount importance when it came to the
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organization of the army. Ordinances issued by Henry V in 1419 recognized the existence the
indiscipline and attempted to control it by ordering that:
All maner of men beyng wyth in our hooste, what so euer degree, state,
condicion, or countrey he be of, that he be lowely obedient to our constable &
marshal in All lawefull And honest things, vnder payne of forfayting body and
goodes. Also we comaunde that All [soldiers], And All suche that reseue wages of
vs And oure Realme, be lykewyse obedient vnto theyr immediatt captaynes And
maisters.69
This ordinance charged both the officers and the common soldiers to obey the chain of command
on penalty of loss of wages or other goods, thus presenting a serious attempt to prevent
indiscipline in the army by creating a clear chain of command, with soldiers obeying their
immediate superiors and captains obeying the constable and marshal, and punishments for those
that disobey it. The constable and marshal had authority delegated to them to try in military
courts any soldiers that engaged in crimes such as desertion or broke the rules of discipline. 70 It
is perhaps notable to point out that the captains had to obey the constable and marshal instead of
directly obeying the king. Granted, it is assumed that the constable and marshal acted on behalf
of the king, but it is still interesting to point out that in this specific ordinance the king is not
directly in command of the army. This is due to the fact that, as the aggressor throughout the
war, the king could afford to give his commanders more freedom to act, resulting in an organized
but not centrally commanded army. 71
A system of providing provisions also had to be established along with the creation of an
army. Living merely off the land, especially in foreign territory, could prove difficult and lead to
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both indiscipline and poor relations with the civilian population. A 1418 letter between Henry V
and the Aldermen of London perfectly reflects the needs of the army for provisions and the
method by which it was delivered. In the letter, Henry V writes that the Aldermen should “in all
the haste that ye may, ye will [cause to] ariue as manie smale vessels as ye may goodly, with
[provisions] and [especially] with drinke,” stipulating that “for the which vessels ther shal be
ordeigned suffisant [escort],” thus providing protection for the vital supplies. 72 Keeping the
troops well supplied not only kept them prepared for battle, it also kept them happy and less
likely to pillage the countryside and spread indiscipline and disorganization within the army.
With enough food and drink, the soldiers were likely more willing to obey orders.
In speaking of provisioning, it is important to take a moment to mention the growing
importance of the navy that came as a result of the Hundred Years War. While neither side made
many innovations in naval warfare, there was no creation of a permanent navy, and there was not
much in the way of fierce determination to control the sea, it was still important in military terms
as a barrier and as a vital route to transport men and supplies to the various theaters of war. One
of the opening conflicts of the war, that of the Battle of Sluys in 1340, was in fact a naval battle.
This battle saw the French king Philip VI attempt to stop Edward III’s invasion fleet, but ended
with the English destroying the French fleet and gaining control of the English Channel, thus
allowing for multiple invasion forces to cross into France. Both Edward III and Richard II
impressed large numbers of ships for the purpose of defense, and at times these defensive fleets
employed almost as many soldiers as a field army, thus requiring a great expense and showing
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the growing sense of importance when it came to the navy. 73 Naval forces were even sometimes
used in conjunction with land forces, especially in sieges, as can be seen in the siege of Calais by
the English in 1347 and the siege of Harfleur by the French in 1416. 74 Utilizing the sea as a
method of disrupting trade and engaging in coastal raids was also seen during the Hundred Years
War. The French engaged in this in 1377 when they pillaged and burned the coastal town of Rye
is Sussex County. 75
The army of England also had to change as the goals of the war changed. Under the reign
of Henry V and Henry VI, the short campaigns of pillage and plunder were no longer the goal of
the crown. Instead, the goal had become conquest and the defense of that conquest, which
facilitated the need to reorganize the army from a constantly moving, pillaging body into an
occupation and garrisoning force to secure the conquered land. 76
In many ways, France developed its army in much the same fashion. France, even early
in the war, began issuing pay for soldiers based on rank. This can be seen in an ordinance issued
by John II in 1351, detailing that “one banneret will receive in wages forty shillings a day; a
knight, twenty shillings,” and so on.77 This same ordinance also called for a muster and review,
ordering that “close attention shall be paid to see whether he is riding the horse which was listed,
and whether he is properly armed, as he ought to be.”78 Should any of the soldiers reviewed be
found lacking in their numbers or equipment, their pay was thus withheld as a fine. In this way,
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both discipline and military effectiveness could be maintained. Once again in the same
ordinance, other methods of maintaining effectiveness and discipline were utilized, such as
ordering that any group of soldiers that are without a commander to be assigned one by the
Constable, Marshal, or Master of the Crossbowmen, as well as providing replacement horses for
knights whose mounts were killed or lost.79 This is not to say that the system was completely
efficient from the outset. The ordinances of 1351 and 1374 reveal that captains and troops were
defrauding the king, mustering officers and paymasters willingly gave false information, bribes
were accepted, and wages were withheld and pocketed.80 In addition, the French were still not a
fully organized and disciplined force at this time. Jean le Bel describes the French force at the
Battle of Crecy as being “one in front of the other without any order,” as opposed to the careful
and ordered position of the English, which he suggests contributed to their defeat.81 These issues
would be all but rectified by the time of Charles VII.
Despite this example of early steps towards the creation of a royal army, France had not
completely abandoned the arriere-ban, or the general call to arms, that was the staple of feudal
methods of raising a military. A 1369 proclamation by Charles V utilized the arriere-ban to
order the people of Rouen to “be duly armed and mounted, and those who cannot reasonably
procure shall [at least] be adequately armed…so as to resist our said enemies, and do and carry
out what you think best for the proper defense of our kingdom.”82 This reflects that France still
had not completely abandoned the old feudal practice like England had and that national defense
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and military action was still on a somewhat local level at this time. However, it should be noted
that this was likely done out of emergency, as France was on the defensive at this point during
the war and likely was too engaged in other areas to send a sufficient professional force.
Essentially, the defensive needs of France meant that the more traditional feudal method of
raising an army would survive longer than it would in England. 83 England did not face the
problem of enemy invasion and thus did not need to call for its citizens to take up arms in their
own defense or issue any sort of feudal call to arms.
In spite of his use of the arriere-ban, Charles V continued to organize the army with his
own ordinances. The ordinance issued in 1374 attempted to take measures to stop desertion, as
well as implemented measures to establish proper military units controlled by officers that acted
on behalf of the king. This is made most clear when the ordinance states that “none shall be a
captain of men-at-arms in our service…without our letters and authority…under penalty of
forfeiting horses and equipment, and all moveable possessions and land.” 84 This could perhaps
be seen as a step taken to curb mercenary problems by punishing them for commanding troops
without the king’s permission, but more importantly it is an example of the growing organization
of the army and the concepts of discipline and order that would define the army that was
commanded by the king. Charles V continued in his attempts to create a national army, made up
entirely of volunteers bound to the king through lettres de retenue, a concept similar to English
indentures, and commanded by officers that were appointed by and firmly controlled by the king
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in order to establish a force that could effectively achieve the goal of reconquest.85
Unfortunately, the death of Charles V and the Constable Bertrand du Guesclin in 1380, which
led to the crowing of the mentally unstable Charles VI and growing political disorder, led to the
decline of the French army as an effective force until the reign of Charles VII.
This idea of discipline brought about by a paid professional army was very much
appealing to the leaders of France, just as it was to the leaders of England. Philippe de Mezieres,
a councilor of Charles VI who urged his king to issue changes in the French army, expressed this
when he stated that “a good number of first-rate soldiers fighting with your gallant and royal
majesty will…bring you greater victory than would a large crowd of your subjects, some of
whom will have come voluntarily, others through the arriere-ban, but all of whom will lack
discipline,” reflecting a growing belief that it is better to pay for soldiers that will fight
professionally and with a sense of order rather than a mob of quickly and temporarily raised
troops .86 A professional army of disciplined troops began to be seen as being superior, even
against a numerically superior enemy, and thus more desirable to all areas of society.
The evolution of the national army reached its zenith under the reign of Charles VII, who
established an army with the organization and discipline to finally put an end to the war and
expel the English. Charles VII issued these ordinances with the purpose of asserting the authority
of the crown to appoint military commands and to make the army an efficient weapon of the
state that was controlled by the king. 87 A chronicler by the name of Mathieu d’Escouchy writes
that Charles VII organized the army under fifteen captains who were chosen by him, each of
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whom would have one hundred lances under his command, with each lance consisting of six
persons: three archers, a man armed with a dagger, a man-at-arms, and a page. Each of these
captains and their troops would be assigned to different towns in different provinces throughout
the kingdom in order to effectively defend the kingdom as a whole. 88 These reforms seemed to
take a firm hold within the army, as the chronicler Monstrelet noted that “All these soldiers were
paid regularly each month, and during the campaign none of them would dare to make any
prisoners or ransom any horse or other beast, unless they belonged to the English and their allies,
nor to seize provisions anywhere without paying for them, again unless they were in possession
of the English engaged in warfare, for they could lawfully seize only these latter.”89 Perhaps
most importantly, Charles VII issued an ordinance in 1448 that established the francs-archers, a
group comprised of one man from each parish in France that was charged with always keeping
himself ready and equipped for war. Charles declared in this ordinance that “it is right and proper
that we should establish and ordain in our kingdom a certain number of men for its defense, men
of whom we can make use in our service in time of war without our having to employ others
than our own subjects for this purpose,” thus forming the nucleus of a permanent, national
army. 90 Much as in England under Edward III, these archers were charged with practicing on all
feast days and holidays so that they remained prepared in case of war, and in addition to their
pay of four francs per month, they were also exempt from all taxes, all but ensuring that those
chosen as francs-archers should have been more than willing to continue to keep themselves
prepared as they were ordered to. This system of payment and benefits in exchange for
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disciplined and professional military service is a perfect example of how the French national
army developed and operated. While Charles VII justified this act of establishing a permanent
army by citing the external threat of England and the internal threat of mercenary companies
ravaging France, the army was maintained long after both threats had subsided.
The chief difference these changes in France and the changes in England is that the
changes in France were spearheaded by the king, who served as a symbol of unity to France
during the trying times of invasion and defeat that was the Hundred Years War. 91 The process of
creating a national army in England developed swiftly, while in France the development was
slow and experienced periods of stasis or regression, but by the end of the war Charles VII had
outdone his English counterpart.92 The end result was an army that was directly controlled by the
king rather than through a system of delegation, thus creating an army that was truly an
instrument of the state.
The Soldiers
For these new national armies, a new kind of military leader was required. No longer did
the upper echelons of the nobility hold a monopoly over the heights of military command.
Instead, military commanders were chosen based on proven skill and ability, and some of the
most famous and successful commanders of the Hundred Years War came from the ranks of the
lesser nobility. This type of social advancement was seen even in the early years of the war, as
Thomas Grey noted in the late 1350s when he wrote that “many [men began their careers] as
archers, then becoming knights, and some of them captains,” showing that merit and skill were
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being rewarded with advancement even at the wars beginning. 93 Perhaps the single greatest
example of this early practice of advancement through merit was the appointment of Bertrand du
Guesclin as Constable of France, the single highest position of military authority outside of the
king himself, in 1370. Froissart wrote that du Guesclin responded to the appointment by saying
that “’it is very true that I am a poor man of low birth,’” and that he was not worthy of this
position. 94 Regardless of his supposedly humble refusal, Charles V still insisted that he and his
council had deemed du Guesclin was indeed worthy of this position, and du Guesclin’s service as
Constable has been seen as the pinnacle of the power and prestige of the office.
As the war continued, the concept of nobility having an unquestioned right to high
military command began to be challenged, especially in France. The Quadrilogue invective,
written by the Norman Alain Chartier in 1422 as his homeland had been overrun by the English,
questioned whether nobility was awarded by virtue of birth or by recognition of merit, thereby
questioning whether birth warranted high military office or if said offices should be given to
those of experience and merit in times of war. 95 This question was more or less answered over
the course of the war, as leaders of proven skill were sorely needed on both sides of the conflict.
Strong leaders that commanded respect based on their accomplishments were instrumental in
maintaining discipline and order within the growing national armies of both England and France,
and the ability to lead became increasingly associated with personal qualities and skills which
then earned nobility and renown.96 Charles VII furthered this recognition of merit with his
military reform ordinances, where he appointed military leaders and gave promotions based on
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ability rather than having nobles take positions through the “right” of their birth. 97 These
qualities and this growing sense of skill and merit earning nobility paved the way for the creation
of the military academies of the 16th century. 98
Even the captains of mercenary companies, if they proved themselves capable
commanders, were able to achieve positions of authority during the Hundred Years War. Arnaud
de Cervole was in and out of French royal appointment and was appointed royal chamberlain in
1363, Amiel de Baux held office and a military position under the French crown in 1371, and
Hugh Calveley and Robert Knolles both also served as mercenary captains before serving the
English king. 99 Even the famed Bertrand du Guesclin was himself a Breton mercenary captain
before he served the French crown as Constable.
Perhaps the most famous military commander of the Hundred Years War, and certainly
one of most unusual individuals of this time to be placed in charge of troops, is undoubtedly the
Maid of Orleans, Joan of Arc. There is debate as to the extent of Joan’s actual role within the
military, whether she fought and directly commanded troops or gave advice to noble
commanders or simply served as a symbol for the army to rally behind, but it is known that she
received explicit permission from Charles VII, who was known to directly choose his military
commanders, to attempt to do what she claimed she had been ordained by God to carry out, that
being the lifting of the siege of Orleans and the expulsion of the English from France, despite the
skepticism and hostility shown to her at court.100 Even if her role was limited to serving as a

97

Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 73.
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 53.
99
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 75.
100
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 33.
98

39

symbol, far from the battlefield, the fact that Charles VII encouraged her and allowed her within
the army at all is a testament to the changing landscape of the French army.
With the advent of artillery and siege weapons such as serpentines and culverins, which
were deemed “unchivalrous” as compared to cavalry by the nobility and thus not generally
commanded by them, new positions of authority and importance were made available to those
who could prove proficient in their use. For instance, an account of the Battle of Castillon in
1453 describes that “There was then in the king of France’s service, as superintendent of all
these machines [artillery] and of all the other material of war, a certain Jean Bureau, a citizen of
Paris, a man of humble origin and of small stature, but of purpose and daring who was
particularly skilled and experienced in the use and exercise of weapons of this sort,” and goes on
to say that Jean Bureau had even served in a similar capacity to the king of England. 101 This
shows that extensive knowledge and expertise in the use of artillery, not high birth, was the
requirement for such a high position of authority, and perfectly represents the growing sense of
promoting merit in all aspects of the military.
For the English, knights of the lower aristocracy such as Sir Thomas Dagworth, Sir
Robert Knolles, and Sir Hugh Claveley, achieved fame and authority in the late 14th century
through their skill rather than their birth, relying on their reputations and their successes for
support.102 These English knights of comparatively lower social status but long years of service
were further elevated in the 15th century, as the number of knights in the English army had begun
to decline, and the vast numbers of territories in France that needed to be protected and
garrisoned required the presence of authority in the form of one of these lower aristocratic
101
102

Thomas Basin, Histoire des regnes de Charles VII et de Louis XI, from Allmand, Society at War, 111.
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 71.

40

knights.103 However, comparatively speaking, England could not boast as many individuals of
such humble origins like du Guesclin serving in such high positions of authority like constable or
marshal. 104 This could in part be explained due to the high success rate of the upper echelons of
the English nobility during the war, as opposed to the typically poor record of military
performance of the French royalty and nobility. The French found themselves with a much
greater need for effective military commanders in order to reverse their losses and defend the
land that was slowly being swallowed up by the English, and thus were more open to accepting
the comparatively lower members of the aristocracy into powerful positions of military authority
based on their skill and merit if it meant that they would provide the French with a greater
chance for victory.
But while the leaders of armies are no doubt important, one must not forget that wars are
won by soldiers, and the Hundred Years War saw the development of skilled and professional
soldiers. As noted in the previous chapter, mounted knights engaging in cavalry charges were
gradually losing importance in warfare as new weapons, better trained infantry, and shifting
objectives during the Hundred Years War caused them to become less important in achieving
victory. The common soldier, especially the archer, came to replace the heavy cavalry as the
most important unit in war, even if they still were not as respected as the mounted nobility. The
infantryman and the archer continuously grew in importance as the war progressed, and
soldiering for many became a profitable lifetime career due to the new methods of army
organization that provided ample enticements for those who would serve.
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The recognition of the importance of the archer developed fairly early in the war for
England, likely as a result of their heavy contribution to English victory in the battles of Crecy
and Poitiers. Jean le Bel wrote that at the Battle of Crecy, “The arrows of the English were
directed with such marvelous skill at the horsemen that their mounts refused to advance a step,”
thus largely contributing to their victory. 105 Froissart in turn wrote that during the Battle of
Poitiers “the English archers were an inestimable advantage to their comrades, and struck terror
into the hearts of the French, for the rain of arrows was so continuous and so thick that the
French did not know where to turn to avoid them, with the result that the English kept gaining
ground.”106 Later, in 1363, Edward III made a point to address the lapse in the practice of archery
throughout England, and ordered that “all able-bodied persons within your county should, on
feast days, when there is a holiday, practice with bows and arrows, and with crossbows and bolts
in their games, so as to learn and exercise the art of archery,” even going so far as to threaten
imprisonment if they should engage in other activities than these. 107 The importance of archery
to the English military cause is clearly shown in this, but what is also shown is that Edward III
ordered that “all able-bodied persons” should engage in the practice of archery, meaning nobles
and non-nobles, which could be interpreted as a recognition of the contribution and importance
of the non-noble soldier in terms of serving the state. In this regard it is important to point out
that archers and infantrymen were drawn from the ranks of the peasantry and yeomanry, not the
nobility, and yet formed the backbone of the English army both numerically and tactically. 108
The importance of archers and regular infantry on the battlefield was again shown during the
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Battle of Agincourt in 1415. An eye-witness account states that the English arrows “fell so thick
and fast that no man dared to uncover himself nor even to look up,” wounding many of the
French troops before the armies could close the gap between each other, and continues by stating
that after sending the French cavalry into disarray, the English archers then took up their melee
weapons and proceeded to kill the disorganized French forces without mercy. 109 Thus it was that
the longbow became the backbone of the arsenal of a successful army, due to its proven success
on the battlefield, its penetrating power, its range, and its ability to be utilized by a lightly armed
foot soldier, mounted as part of a light cavalry force, and during the sieges that came to play a
more important role in the later stages of the war.110 The longbow almost became a symbol,
especially to the class of people that utilized it, as it was the weapon that was overturning the
military hierarchies and laying waste to the previously dominant force that was the knightly
cavalry. It is no surprise that Robin Hood, the only English literary hero prior to the modern era
that was a commoner and not a noble, was famously armed with a longbow.111
In speaking of Robin Hood, whose story was popular by the time of the reign of Edward
III and which continued to grow in popularity throughout the war, there is much to be said of
what the new and formidable soldier looked like. Essentially, Robin Hood was no different than
any man except that he was skilled with a bow, and while this made him quite formidable, it was
not beyond the power of the common man and the common soldier to be as Robin Hood was. 112
It is also important to note that most of Robin’s enemies and the victims of his attacks were
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barons or knights, symbolizing the overthrow of the noble caste of warriors by the common
infantryman, or perhaps even the superiority of the infantryman over the noble knight. 113 It does
seem that the archer, as personified by Robin Hood, had become a far more effective unit on the
battlefield than the mounted knight.
Other units and types of soldiers aside from archers also contributed to the war effort
more than heavy cavalry. In addition to the increasingly dismounted men-at-arms, engineers and
specialists in siege and artillery weapons along with sappers with simple picks and shovels
formed essential elements to a victorious army as the conflict continued into later years,
especially as sieges became more common and strategically important.114 Nor were archers
invulnerable, as was shown during the siege of Calais when a group of “common soldiers”
attacked a group of English archers stationed in a nearby tower and succeeded in killing them. 115
But again, due to their effectiveness and versatility, archers remained the backbone of the
evolving army.
It is especially important to note that Charles VII’s 1448 ordinance that essentially
created the first permanent military force in France, the francs-archers, was made up of archers
rather than knights or any other form of mounted force. Their value in war over the heavily
armored and mounted knight was recognized in this ordinance, and their skills were deemed vital
enough to require that they practice on all holidays and feast days so that their skills would
remain honed. This clearly shows that the more common and low-born infantry had secured a
place of supreme importance within the new permanent and professional army that would
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continue to emerge and develop in the coming centuries. Thus, infantry had evolved from a
secondary role behind the noble cavalry, primarily utilized in a defensive manner, into a widely
used and important component of a professional army as both an attacking and defending
force.116
One of the main causes that facilitated the rise of skilled and professional soldiers was the
declining practice of military service based on feudal obligation, and the transition to voluntary
military service based on the enticements placed before soldiers to make them serve the cause of
the king. Thus, wars had come to be fought by men dedicated to the profession of arms and
military values, where war for them had become a business.
As noted earlier in the chapter, soldiers had begun to be paid from the king’s treasury for
voluntary service in war. This is perhaps the greatest and most obvious form of enticement that
was utilized to swell the ranks of the armies of England and France. Far more men would be
likely to volunteer, and be far more likely to listen and obey orders and regulations, if they are
being compensated with wages. The promise of regular and reliable wages, no matter how small,
would have been hard for many to resist. And with this development of paid service, along with
the development of permanent national armies, war and soldiering became a business just as any
other, with men dedicating their lives to its practice.
Once again returning to the francs-archers, we see another example of the new benefits
offered that so enticed men to serve as professional soldiers. In addition to their pay of four
francs a month, Charles VII added that “in order that they shall be better able and more anxious
to keep themselves prepared in the above mentioned state and condition, we have ordered, and
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now order by these presents, that each and every one shall be free, quit and exempt not only from
all direct and other taxes which may be imposed on our behalf on the kingdom, [but also] from
the duty of maintaining our soldiery, from [all] guard duty, and all imposts whatever,” with the
exception of the salt tax.117 This demonstrates the exceptional quality of the benefits available to
those that chose to serve as professional soldiers in a permanent force, and demonstrates what
may be the peak of the methods of enticement that helped to grow this new class of soldiers.
Other forms of enticement were also presented to prospective soldiers. Pardons for
various offences and the opportunity for promotion and social advancement was one such
form. 118 In England, especially during the reign of Henry V, another form of enticement was
introduced in order to gain more volunteers to serve in France. This was the granting of land and
titles to those that served.119 Not only would this draw more soldiers to his cause, it would also
help solve the problem of maintenance and administration of the newly conquered territory. It
should be noted though that it is highly unlikely that those of non-noble origins would have been
granted such a prize.
In addition to the regular paid wages issued by the king and his officials, pillaging and
the spoils gained from it was an integral part of the earnings of a soldier.120 Pillaging was an
officially recognized, legal, and even encouraged practice in both England and France, and was
regulated and organized just as paid wages were. A 1419 ordinance by Henry V gives a look into
how pillaged goods were divided: “All maner of captaynes, knyghtes, squyers, men of Armes,
Archers, what so euer they be, shall be bounde to paye parte of All theyr gayness in warre
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faithfully, And wyth owte fraude, to theyr imediate captayne or maister, in payne of lesing the
hooll principall somme so gotten.”121 Essentially, the pillaged goods were collected and, once
their monetary value had been assessed, were then distributed according to rank, with the higher
echelons of the army receiving the lion’s share. This means that no matter how much booty a
common soldier or archer secured, the majority of it would go to his superiors. Regardless, the
common soldier, even one that had not managed to secure booty, was still entitled to a
percentage of the value of the pillaged goods, albeit a relatively small percentage, and this along
with the promise of wages was enough to entice men into military service. Thus war, especially
success in war, came to be seen as a profitable business.
Indeed, these benefits were so pleasing that many wished for the war to continue so that
they may continue to receive them. Froissart recorded such feelings in 1390 when he wrote
“Others, too, who favoured the [continuation of the] war were the less well-off knights, esquires,
and archers of England, who appreciated its comforts and, indeed, maintained their status
through war.”122 This not only shows how important and how valuable the benefits and
enticements of service in war were, but it also emphasizes that war had become a profession and
a method of achieving wealth and status for even the relatively lower sections of society.
However, this system of benefits, especially the system of paid wages, was by no means
perfect or infallible. Wages were rarely generous to the lower ranks of soldiers and often were
paid erratically, and sometimes not at all. 123 Jean le Bel claimed that this was the case for the
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French soldiers during the reign of Phillip VI, having written that they had to spend their own
money and even sell their horses and arms while waiting to be paid from the king’s treasury. 124
This led to many problems, with the soldiers attempting to make up for their lost wages
with even greater and more disorderly pillaging that greatly hurt civilian populations. Granted,
organized and regulated pillaging is still pillaging, and was still seen as dishonorable and abusive
by those that suffered from it. For this reason, soldiers came to be seen as a menace, with Honore
Bonet summing up the thoughts of many civilians when he wrote “the man who does not know
how to set places on fire, to rob churches and usurp their rights and to imprison the priests, is not
fit to carry on war.”125
Appatis, a form of protection money, was another method for soldiers to gain more
wealth at the expense of the townspeople in order to keep marauding soldiers from simply
pillaging them. 126 An example of the use of the appatis can be seen in the 1437 agreement
between the city of Reims and the soldiers under the command of Guillaume de Flavy for the
price of 300 pounds to keep de Flavy and his soldiers from robbing the city. 127 These abuses
worsened as the war continued, especially once the focus of the war became the garrisoning and
the guarding of towns, castles, and other strategic points. This limited the engagements with the
enemy, which limited the opportunities for obtaining a fortune in plunder, which in turn caused
many soldiers to turn to robbery and ransom. 128 Because of these instances of abuse and violence
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against civilians, many came to see soldiers as no better than the mercenaries that were so
prevalent during the Hundred Years War.
Mercenaries
When speaking of the Hundred Years War, it is important to discuss the prevalence of
mercenary companies that were active, especially in France, over the course of the war. These
mercenary companies were in large part responsible for most of the atrocities committed on the
land and people of France, and in many ways were a catalyst for social change.
Freelance mercenary bands were typically made up of former soldiers, formed from the
frequent failure of armies to regularly pay their soldiers, leading to a failure to maintain firm
discipline and for disaffected soldiers to be lured by the easily gained riches of plunder. 129 The
majority of these companies were active in France, likely due to the tide of war usually being
against France and the fact that nearly the entire war was fought in France. While men of English
and French origins were undoubtedly part of these bands, men of other national origins also
made up a percentage of mercenary companies. Froissart made several mentions of “men of the
German nation” that actively worked as mercenaries in 14 th century France, and even named one
mercenary captain active in Limousin and Languedoc as a German man named Bacon, and
another named Crokart who was active in Brittany. 130 Rodrigo de Villandrando and Francois de
la Surienne both hailed from Spain, Castile being the home of the former and Aragon the home
of the latter.131 And as noted earlier, prior to his appointment as Constable, Bertrand du Guesclin
was a mercenary captain of Breton origins.
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Froissart gives an account of the typical activities of mercenary companies, detailing that
they “captured towns and castles, and gathered around themselves a considerable number of
similar sorts of people, bearing arms,” and Froissart continues that they would “take the richest
citizens as prisoners, in addition to the very towns which they had captured, and ransom them to
the people of the district, or even to the very townsfolk whom they had expelled.” 132 This was by
far not the worst these bands could do. A record of the actions of a mercenary group known as
the Flayers describes how, in addition to robbing and burning homes, these men would severely
beat those who refused to pay ransom, and in at least one instance murdered them by throwing
them from the top of a high tower after they refused to pay. 133 Robbery, arson, murder, and rape
were the typical activities of a mercenary group.
These mercenary bands were formed because of a weak government and a state of almost
constant warfare that left France in disorder and its people all but defenseless. But it is perhaps
because of the actions of these marauders that contemporaries began to look for solutions and to
institute the changes that have been discussed earlier in this thesis. The problem of mercenaries
was thought to be caused by indiscipline and the inability to regularly pay soldiers, and thus
these issues were rectified in the manner as mentioned above, leading to the development of the
paid professional army. 134 Mercenaries themselves were groups that were paid for military
service, and this may have influenced the decision for royal armies to be based on payment. Also
recall that Charles VII’s creation of the francs-archers, a permanent national army that benefitted
from regular pay and tax exemption, was in part justified by the marauding bands of mercenaries
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that threatened France. Indeed, after their creation, Monstrelet wrote that “no robbers or brigands
dared to infest the roads,” and that travelers were no longer threatened by mercenary groups like
the Skinners now that there was a permanent military. 135 This shows that the presence of
mercenaries was a direct cause for the establishment of a permanent national army.
In addition, highly successful mercenaries can be credited as furthering the advancement
of military merit replacing high noble birth as the criteria for military positions. Aside from the
obvious mention of du Guesclin and the previous mention of Arnaud de Cervole, Amiel de Baux,
Hugh Calveley, and Robert Knolles earlier in this chapter, there are other known examples of
this. The man named Bacon mentioned by Froissart served Philip VI and John II as inspector of
arms and was well off for the rest of his days. 136 The command that certain mercenaries had over
their men, and sometimes the simple fact that they controlled strategically vital areas, also made
it to where kings found it foolish or even impossible not to give them advancement.137
Mercenaries may even in part be responsible for the rise of the most unusual of military
commanders during the Hundred Years War. It was during a series of mercenary attacks along
the Meuse that Joan of Arc had begun hearing the supposed “voices” that led her to aiding to turn
the tide of the war.138 Perhaps Joan was simply tired of mercenaries and soldiers threatening her
home, and their violence inspired her to action.
Perhaps most of all, mercenaries represented that war had become a business, a
profession through which men could make a profit and even find great wealth. It is important to
note that many men became mercenaries because they had been soldiers and, during the pauses
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of peace, they could not practice what had become their trade and thus could not make a
living.139 Thus for many, truce and peace came to mean unemployment for soldiers, who would
in turn become marauding mercenaries in order to continue to make money. This can be
especially seen in the 1350s and 1360s when there was little “official” fighting between England
and France but a growth in the bands of former soldiers that pillaged the countryside. 140 Froissart
wrote that by the end of Crokart’s career, he was worth “60,000 ancient ecus." 141 Merigot
Marches was said to have collected more than 20,000 florins from the use of the appatis, and
Geoffrey Tete-Noir supposedly put thirty leagues of countryside to ransom from his base in
Ventadour.142 This shows that there was money to be made in war, even if it wasn’t as an official
soldier. The ability to wage war became a profitable profession that men dedicated themselves
to, even if it meant pillaging their own country.
But while the presence of mercenaries may have to led to positive social change, their
damage to the countryside and their abuse to the civilian population cannot be forgotten. Most of
the worst abuses carried out by mercenaries, and overall some of the most negative effects of the
war, were suffered by the non-combatant. The sufferings of the non-combatant, as well as their
successes, will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: THE NON-COMBATANT
This thesis has thus far discussed the nobility and the soldiery that actively fought in the
Hundred Years War, but this chapter shall be looking at the group that was perhaps the most
affected by the war, that being the non-combatants. For the sake of clarification, I shall define
the term “non-combatant” as one who did not partake in the actual fighting of the war, but
contributed to or was affected by the war and its outcome, so that the term may include those that
served in the military in a non-combat role. This means that the term includes those that
contributed to the war, willingly or unwillingly, through providing some good or service other
than direct military service as a soldier. The first group of non-combatants that will be examined
is the group comprised of those unfortunate enough to suffer the most negative aspects of the
war, such as the peasant farmers who became the primary target for the armies and mercenaries
of both kingdoms throughout the course of the war. Especially in France, loyalties became
divided as the land was constantly shifting hands as the war progressed, putting enormous strain
on those who simply wanted to live peacefully without suffering under whoever controlled their
land at the time. The almost constant raids by both armies, as well as by independent mercenary
companies, along with the increasing demands the nobility placed on the peasantry to continue
the war, led to several incidents of uprisings that saw a demand for the rights of the peasantry.
This increasing demand for change could be seen as a positive effect of the war, but regardless
there were non-combatants that greatly benefitted from the war through their contribution to its
continuation. Merchants and professionals such as carpenters, blacksmiths, etc., were in great
demand during the war. The fact that they were paid for their services meant that they became
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invested in the war, seeing it as something that affected them rather than just a squabble among
the nobility, and also meant that society was becoming more militarized, with some merchants
and professionals hoping to prolong the war as much as possible in order to keep profiting from
it. This investment in the war, along with the increased political awareness and social mobility
caused by the war, began the process of an ordinary peasant becoming a citizen with defined
rights in the following centuries after the conclusion of the war. The Church also managed to
play an important role as a non-combatant, most typically as a voice of peace and serving as a
mediator between the two warring nations, often participating in truce and treaty talks between
England and France. But the Church did its share of prolonging the conflict as well, with
clergymen serving as mediums for propaganda in support of whichever kingdom held his loyalty.
Considering that the Great Schism took place during the later years of the Hundred Years War, it
is feasible to argue that the clergy within England and France each became more biased towards
their respective nations considering they were on opposite sides of the Schism, meaning that they
came to serve more as tools of support and divine justification rather than neutral parties
promoting peace among God’s people 143. They would thus serve as one catalyst for the growing
sense of nationalism that was one of the results of the Hundred Years War.
Those Who Lost
The non-combatant was the group most negatively affected by the Hundred Years War,
suffering the worst consequences through having their lands pillaged, their property seized, and
their people killed by both foreign and domestic enemies. The vast majority of the noncombatants that suffered during the course of the war were the civilians of France, but the
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atrocities committed against these civilians were carried out by the English and the French in
roughly equal measure.
Throughout the war, it was the non-combatant that was the primary target for the armies
of both England and France. As discussed in previous chapters, non-combatants were targeted
because they were relatively less risky to attack, yielded plunder that few soldiers or nobles
could resist, served to take away a source of production from the enemy, and served to
symbolically attack the authority of the king and demoralize his subjects. While the reason for
attacking non-combatants is militarily sound, it does not take away from the suffering that this
caused to those targeted by these attacks. The French cleric Honore Bonet wrote that “in these
days all wars are directed against the poor laboring people and against their goods and chattels,”
and declared that this was not a just war but was rather an act of robbery on a massive scale, thus
condemning its practice and expressing sorrow for those non-combatants.144 Froissart described
these attacks in an account on an English raid along the French coast in the earliest years of the
war, writing that “The archers and foot soldiers advanced along by the sea-coast, robbing,
pillaging and stealing everything they found,” and later in the same account wrote, “The English
did what they pleased in the town and castle, but finding that they could not conveniently hold
them, burnt and destroyed both, and then forced the inhabitants to embark on their fleet, and to
go with them, as they had done to those in Barfleur, Cherbourg, Montebourg and all the
neighboring towns on the sea coast which they had captured and plundered.” 145 This account not
only shows that the non-combatants lost their valuables, but also their homes as they were burnt
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by the invaders simply because the English could not maintain control over it, and were then
forced to accompany their conquerors as prisoners. It is also important to point out that Froissart
states that this same practice had already been used on multiple occasions prior, and considering
that these were committed during the early years of the war, it shows that the non-combatant was
suffering the negative effects of the war from its very beginning and, as this chapter will show,
would continue to suffer until its end.
Even once the focus of war shifted from chevauchees to siege warfare, civilian noncombatants were still the group that suffered the most. Froissart details an early siege during the
campaigns of Edward the Black Prince, writing that once a section of the city’s walls were
destroyed “the pillagers on foot were all ready to damage property and to run through the town
killing men, women, and children according to orders they had received,” with the entire city
itself being summarily pillaged and destroyed.146 The fact that these soldiers had specifically
been ordered to kill civilians, even women and children, shows the extent to which the innocent
non-combatant could suffer during this war. John Page, a soldier who served under Henry V,
described the six month siege of Rouen and the plight of the civilians, who were helpless and
suffering throughout the entirety of the siege, thus showing that even the soldiers who were
committing these acts realized the extent of the hardship that was being inflicted on civilians. 147
In Rouen, and in many other such towns that were subject to siege warfare in the later years of
the Hundred Years War, the people inhabiting the towns were given the option to surrender,
which often included the giving of hostages and paying a fine, or face pillage and death once the
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invading army entered the city. In either case, the non-combatants ultimately suffered the most.
Even should the city repel the attacks, the misery of enduring a siege can surely be counted
among the sufferings inflicted upon non-combatants.
The French, in turn, also targeted English non-combatants on English soil, though not to
the same extent and usually through coastal raids. The 1370s in particular saw the French attack
and plunder towns and villages located on the south coast of England, the lives and livelihoods
of the fishermen who resided in those villages suffering as a result. 148 Froissart wrote of an
incident shortly before the coronation of England’s Richard II, in which, “the French landed at
Rye, a port in the county of Sussex, near the borders of Kent, a fair-sized town of fishermen and
sailors. They pillaged and burnt the whole town, then took to their ships.” 149 This shows that the
French were more than willing to engage in the same strategy of attacking non-combatants as the
English, with English civilians suffering the consequences. However, the French were not able to
do it as often or to the same extent due to the war taking place almost entirely on French soil, and
the obvious difficulties of organizing a naval expedition to engage in coastal raids, which was
likely viewed as secondary to defending French territory. Thus the French engaged in the
practice of plundering and the targeting of non-combatants just as the English did, though the
majority of said plundering took place in France rather than England.
As was often the case of the Hundred Years War, the non-combatants of France suffered
the greatest and the most often. This was certainly true when it came to armies who were often
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required to live off the land, which more often than not meant pillaging civilians for supplies. 150
Froissart gave an example of this when he wrote of the expeditions of the Black Prince, writing
that “when they entered into a town and found it stocked with food they refreshed themselves for
two or three days and then departed, destroying what remained, staving in barrels of wine and
burning fields of wheat and oats so that the enemy might not have the use of them.”151 This
shows the destruction caused to civilians while armies “lived off the land,” and again illustrates
how the goods and properties of the non-combatant served as a primary military target in order to
deprive the enemy of resources. The need for an army to live off the land was indicative of an
invading army, thus it was often the English who robbed French civilians for supplies, however
it should be noted that it is plausible that the French did much the same to civilians within French
territories under the control of England when attempting to retake their lost lands. As noted in
the previous chapter, monarchs like Henry V attempted to reduce the need for living off the land,
thus reducing attacks on civilians for supplies, but these attacks still occurred nonetheless, much
to the dismay of the non-combatant.
Even when not directly attacked, non-combatants still suffered greatly at the hands of the
soldiers and mercenary companies that roamed the countryside. This can be most clearly seen in
the appatis, which as discussed in the previous chapter, was a form of protection money that
sometimes meant a town was given military protection, but oftentimes was paid in order to
simply keep the soldiers from burning the town. 152 Citing once again the example of the 1437
agreement between the city of Rheims and the company under Guillaume de Flavy, a payment of
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300 pounds tournois was paid “so as to be spared the pillaging and robbery which [Guillame’s]
men might have carried out upon this city and the surrounding countryside.”153 The statement
continues that it was only through the generosity of the citizen Jean Gibour that the city was able
to raise the funds to pay off the soldiers, indicating that the sum required of them was quite
substantial, and likely had negative effects for the citizens of the town for some time after. Any
town that did not pay, or refused payment once it was agreed upon, was known to suffer harsh
consequences. Such was the case with a town near Poix, where English forces under Edward III
made an agreement in which the town would pay a sum to prevent the army from burning their
town. The townspeople refused to pay the agreed upon sum when they realized that the army had
left, only for some soldiers to return and kill the townspeople and set the town ablaze.154 Thus is
came to be that soldiers didn’t necessarily even have to attack to cause non-combatants to suffer,
for the simple fear of attack was enough to cause civilians to pay whatever cost to keep from
being killed.
Another aspect of the Hundred Years War that the non-combatant needed to fear was
that, even once territories were secured for one kingdom or the other, eliminating or at least
reducing the threat of attack, non-combatants were still faced with the problem of loyalty and the
consequences of swearing or not swearing it. Oftentimes, the confiscation of estates became the
political and economic price for being on the wrong side at the wrong time. 155 During the reign
of England’s Henry V, any in French lands controlled by England who refused to recognize his
claim as the ruler of France were stripped of their lands and forced into “a form of internal exile
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within France.”156 Indeed, often the policy of English occupation forces during his reign was to
deliberately displace populations in order to replace them with more trustworthy, as in English,
settlers.157 Thus a non-combatant simply caught up in the events of the war and attempting to
survive it often faced many hardships due to his loyalties or lack thereof. An example of this can
be seen in the misfortunes of one Jean Guerard, who fled English-allied Paris with his pregnant
wife and ended up captured and ransomed multiple times by both French and English forces,
faced an almost constant threat of incarceration, and struggled to provide for his family as his
goods were stolen by soldiers. 158 Granted, Jean Guerard received a pardon in 1425 from Henry
VI, recognizing him as a subject of the English king, but his tribulations highlight the struggle
that many non-combatants faced when it came to who they claimed to be loyal to.
As territory shifted hands, especially those following truce agreements, many noncombatants who had lived in a territory that, perhaps for generations, had been a part of one
kingdom but now was the domain of another, found themselves having to swear their loyalty to
what was perceived as a foreign, perhaps even hated power, or be forced to abandon the lands
that they had called their home. Such instances were not uncommon as land in France constantly
shifted between the English and the French throughout the course of the war. This shifting of
lordship could sometimes erupt in violence as the population of the area that was changing hands
may not wish to accept a new lord. This can be seen in 1394 when the population of Aquitaine
that had been ceded to France rose up in support of the English crown. 159 But above all, these
instances caused the most suffering to those who had settled in that land and made it their home
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for themselves and their children. Henry V gave land to soldiers as reward for their service, and
many of them married French wives and had children in these lands. 160 These people had made a
livelihood in these lands that were granted to them, and these livelihoods were thus lost when the
English conquests couldn’t be maintained. Perhaps the best example of this comes from the pleas
of the inhabitants of the county of Maine, which had been an English territory since the reign of
Henry II, in 1452 to Henry VI as they were forced to leave as part of an agreement between the
kings of France and England. The inhabitants of Maine declare their loyalty to Henry, finding it
deplorable that they should be in obedience to the king of France, who has long been seen as
their enemy, and they lament that they are forced to abandon their lands, possessions, and titles
with virtually no compensation and thus a majority are left “in a state of beggary,” despite their
loyal service to the English crown. 161 This is perhaps the only aspect of the Hundred Years War
where English subjects suffered more than their French counterparts, as lands that had been loyal
to England since the beginning of the war, and indeed lands that had been English for centuries
prior, were now lost and those that remained were either forced to swear loyalty to another or to
abandon a land that may have been home to them and their families for generations.
Non-combatants who were nowhere near the fighting or who didn’t have to worry about
loyalties being questioned once land passed from one hand to another still faced hardships such
as their properties being requisitioned for military purposes, not infrequently to the loss of the
owners. A good example of this is the requisition of merchant ships for use in place of a regular
navy, especially by the English. A 1378 Commons petition explains that “the said fleet has been
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very frequently requisitioned for many expeditions to France and elsewhere; as a result of which,
the owners of the said fleet have suffered very excessive losses and expenses, both by the loss of
ships and boats, and by the depreciation and wastage of masts, chains, anchors, cables and other
forms of gear, without obtaining any form of compensation.” 162 Even other goods that were paid
for, such as bread, meat, beer, and wine, were often bought below the market price of the day
and paid for in a way that often made it difficult for the seller to obtain the money that he was
owed.163 This shows that loss of property and revenue through requisition was just as possible as
the loss of property and revenue through pillaging, and the non-combatant was the victim in both
situations.
In addition to suffering attacks from enemy armies and suffering the consequences of
divided loyalties once conquered, the non-combatant also suffered from the constant harassment
of the mercenary bands, or routiers, and brigands that plagued the countryside of France during
the war. The typical abuses that the non-combatant had to suffer at the hands of a mercenary
company included having their house or entire town set on fire, having whatever valuables they
had stolen, and having their wealthy citizens and even their entire towns taken and then
ransomed back to them, the people that the mercenaries had just expelled. 164 Of course, far more
violent acts were also committed by mercenaries against non-combatants, including murder and
rape. Monstrelet writes that in 1438, “bands of Frenchmen known as the skinners were operating
on the borders of Burgundy, where they were causing considerable damage by taking castles,
seizing prisoners, killing men and ravishing women of all classes, just as if they had been the
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enemies of France.”165 It is interesting to note that a substantial amount of those counted among
the mercenary and brigand bands were civilians whose farmlands or homes were either destroyed
or taken as a result of the war.166 Thus, these non-combatants had suffered so much and become
so desperate that they themselves became part of the cycle of violence that affected other noncombatants. This was the case in the 1360s for a man named Jean le Jeusne, who claimed he
turned to brigandage because the lawless activities of soldiers and thieves were such that “’no
laboring man, or any other subject in [France], dared venture securely or go about their business
in the district for fear of being killed or taken for ransom.’”167
During the brief periods of peace that followed the end of each stage of the war, the noncombatant was still not safe from the now unemployed soldiers and mercenaries, as well as the
thieves and brigands that continued to thrive in the aftermath of each stage of the war. A text
detailing an account following the Treat of Bretigny in 1360 describes how in the aftermath of
the truce, “Robbers and thieves grew in power along the highways and roads and in the woods.
They attacked wayfarers more fiercely than ever before, not only robbing them, but even cutting
their throats without mercy,” and later describes how a dispute between one John of Artois and
the town of Peronne led to John pillaging, burning, and “slaying many of the inhabitants” of the
town , along with many neighboring towns. 168 This shows that even during times of peace, noncombatants were still under threat and there was no way to effectively protect them and enforce
the peace that should have put a stop to the abuses they suffered.
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After suffering much of the hardships of the war through direct violence or the loss of
land, property, or revenue, it is hardly surprising that popular discontent grew among the noncombatants and sometimes escalated into bloody revolts. The Jacquerie revolt of 1358 is the
most well-known of the uprisings in France, and was caused by the failure of the French nobility
in battle, the inability of the French government to stem the tide of marauding mercenaries, and
the increasing demands for taxation to fund the war.169 The fact that the rebelling peasants
blamed the aristocracy for the loses of the war and for the miseries that the war had inflicted on
the peasants reveals that this was a social and political uprising that may have been attempting to
break down or alter the social hierarchy that had been in place for centuries. The Jacquerie
uprising took place in the Beauvaisis, Ile de France, Picardy, Brie, and Champagne, and soon
afterwards galvanized revolts in cities such as Amiens, Caen, Rouen, Montdidier, and Meaux,
but the revolt was suppressed after two weeks of violence. 170 Another revolt in June of 1382 in
Rouen was caused at least partially by the fiscal demands of the French crown, and was similarly
suppressed. 171
Similar revolts were also arising in England. The 1381 Peasants’ Revolt was an uprising
against the English government due to the financial strains of the war and the inability, or the
perceived unwillingness, of the government to defend southern England against increasing
attacks by the French, which in many ways reflects the Jacquerie revolt in France. 172 The
demands of the rebels, as stated by their lead Wat Tyler, were revolutionary for their time. The
demands included readdressing wages, rents, and land ownerships, disendowment of the Church,
169

Green, The Hundred Years War, 43-44.
For more information on this event, see Chapter 2 of The Hundred Years War: A People’s History by David
Green.
171
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 24.
172
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 24.
170

64

an end to serfdom, and an end to all lordship save that of the king. 173 This revolt not only showed
a growing political awareness of the peasantry, which will be discussed later in the chapter, but
also displayed an attempted breakdown of central authority and the barriers between social
boundaries as these rebels demanded more rights while at the same time attempting to reduce the
power of the nobility and clergy. This again shows a similarity to the Jacquerie revolt in France.
The 1381 Revolt was soon suppressed by Richard II, although only after much violence,
including the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and after Richard had broken his word to
the rebels, and nothing came of these demands for the time being. A similar revolt, and the last
English revolt of the Hundred Years War, occurred in May 1450 and was known as Cade’s
Rebellion, its supporters once again citing unfair taxes and corrupt nobles who had caused the
recent loses in France. 174 This revolt was brought down in much the same way as the 1381
Revolt, with Henry VI making promises and seeming to concede to the demands of the rebels
until they disbanded and were hunted down. Regardless of the lack of success for these various
revolts, both English and French, they still reflect a sense of awareness among the civilians that
led them to demand rights as citizens. The Hundred Years War would be the catalyst that began
the process of altering the social hierarchy in Europe and the peasants becoming true citizens of
the early modern period, though more immediate benefits for the non-combatant were also being
provided as a result of the Hundred Years War.
Those Who Gained
Despite these sufferings, not all aspects of the Hundred Years War were negative for the
non-combatant. War offered opportunities for profit, with some non-combatants building their
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174

Green, The Hundred Years War, 61.
Green, The Hundred Years War, 62.

65

entire business around war and becoming relatively wealthy as a result. The war even gave some
non-combatants a chance for social advancement, as the profits gained by the war and the
blurring social boundaries allowed for poor peasants to become respected citizens and perhaps,
though rarely, even attain a title within a few generations. It was these benefits of the war, and
even some of its sufferings, that brought the greatest benefit to the non-combatant, that being a
growing political awareness and an increasing sense of importance in society that led to the
beginnings of defined citizenship and rights.
The invasions and campaigns of the Hundred Years War required more than soldiers or
ships. Armies needed weapons, food, drink, and countless other supplies in order for it to be an
effective force. Thus, especially for the invading English, peasants with professions such as
cooks, fletchers, tailors, blacksmiths, etc. found themselves in high demand. When English war
policy shifted from raids to occupation and garrisoning, the need for peasant specialists was in
even higher demand as soldiers stationed in France would require a constant source of supplies,
material, or craftsmen to construct the much needed fortifications required to hold the territory
they had conquered. Non-combatants taken to assist in raiding campaigns could add as much as
50 per cent to the numbers of the invading force, while an occupation army could double in size
with the amount of non-combatants brought along to assist through their various professions. 175
In addition, siege warfare and the weapons and strategies that defined it also required skilled
non-combatants to assist the army. Monstrelet writes that at the siege of Orleans, “by
arrangement with certain of the local merchants [the wagons] were laden with provisions and
artillery and other necessaries to be taken to the English,” showing once again that non-
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combatants with various professions were brought in to assist in the war effort and thus became
invested in the conflict and informed of its progress. 176
The French were no different in their need for non-combatants to assist with and
contribute to the war.177 There is evidence of muster rolls in French forces that include
“carpenters, masons, quarriers, thatchers, pioneers and waggoners” that were given payment in
exchange for their assistance to French forces at the siege of Cherbourg in 1378. 178
If the non-combatant did not contribute through his professional services, he would
certainly contribute through his money. As noted in the previous chapters, a system of taxation
with the goal of waging war and eventually maintaining an army was growing in use. The kings
of both England and France used the excuse of defending the common good and supporting the
realm to justify taxation to fund armies and campaigns, and it was the civilian or peasant noncombatants who paid the majority of these taxes that supposedly were meant to benefit the
kingdom as a whole. In France, as early as the reign of John II, a system of raising money
through local representative bodies was put in place. A French text describes that the system was
instituted in order to fund an army to combat the English and to raise the money to ransom the
captive John, and states that it included a “levy of 8 pence in the pound on all merchandise and
commodities; [in addition to this], the salt tax…for up to one year; a tax on wine at certain times,
as formerly; 2 shillings in the pound on all income from immovables.” 179 This request puts an
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emphasis on the duty of the community to aid in the funding of national defense, thus bringing
the common civilian into the national consciousness and all but declaring them a vital part of it.
Through these contributions, the non-combatant could indeed make a profit, and in some
cases were able to become wealthy and even titled as a result of contributing to the war. Some of
the great examples of this include William de la Pole in England, whose family rose from
commoner to duke in four generations.180 In France there is the case Jacques Coeur, who attained
great wealth by acting as an arms dealer to Charles VII, or Pierre Baille who rose from a
shoemaker’s assistant to become the treasurer of Maine. 181 Other benefits were offered to the
non-combatants through the tragic sufferings that the war brought on others. The depopulation
caused by the war meant that the power of the landlords diminished, wages increased while
prices fell, and a redistribution of wealth and blurring of social boundaries developed.182 It
should be pointed out that this depopulation and the subsequent societal changes had other
contributing factors, including natural disasters, climate change, and disease such as the Black
Plague. 183 This however does not take away from the importance that the war played in this
process of depopulation and change within society.
In both kingdoms, the people had become generally accustomed to paying regular taxes
for one reason or another thanks to the war.184 But because they had become accustomed to it,
they also began to realize their place in the social order, an important place at that, and some
were willing to take advantage of that. With all of the contributions made by the non-combatant
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both material and monetary, as well as an understandable concern and interest for anything that
may bring him profit, it is not difficult to argue that the non-combatant might feel that he had a
right to have a say in how his contributions, namely the taxes he paid, were used. 185 After all, it
was his money that was being spent to supposedly defend the kingdom and certainly to further
the ambitions of the nobility, so why shouldn’t he try to assert that right? Those peasants who
rose in the revolts discussed previously in the chapter certainly seemed to believe so. They were
rebelling because they had come to recognize that those in the higher rungs of the social
hierarchy were failing to fulfill their duties while the peasants themselves were contributing
more through their taxes than ever before, and yet were still the group that suffered the most
through the years of war. They wanted the system to change and for their importance and rights
to be recognized in the revised system. Most of these changes in the peasant non-combatants,
both the rebellions and the positive social mobility, were the result of an increasing politicization
of the peasantry that was caused by the war.186 The peasants were the taxpayers, many may have
had relatives who were soldiers, and they were subject to the propaganda of the war, which will
be discussed later in the chapter, which kept them informed and thus invested in the success or
failure of each campaign. From this awareness of the peasants comes the first written evidence of
the character of Robin Hood187, the first non-noble main character in English literature,
representing the feelings of the peasantry and symbolizing the changing balance of economic
power and the blurring social boundaries between the upper rungs of the peasantry and the lower
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rungs of the nobility. 188 Just as with the nobles and the soldiers, social lines were becoming less
defined and the peasantry was becoming more aware and invested in both the war and the nation
as a whole, slowly beginning the process that saw their role change from simple serfs who
worked the land into true citizens who had a voice in how their nation was ruled.
The Church
Aside from the civilian professional or merchant, the Church also served as a noncombatant that affected and was affected by the war. Serving as both peace makers and as biased
supporters of one kingdom or the other, the Church would serve an integral role in the Hundred
Years War and would see its power reduced as nations came to view clergymen with suspicion
and kings came to limit the rights of all within the Church hierarchy.
Given their status as men of God, and of His Son who is called the Prince of Peace, it
makes sense that churchmen acted as mediators and negotiators in peace talks throughout the
Hundred Years War. The clergy acted in this manner from the earliest years of the war, as can be
seen when Pope Clement VI called representatives of England and France to a Conference in
Avignon in 1344, though the talks ended with neither partied satisfied and a continued escalation
of the conflict.189 This can also be seen in the papal envoys who pleaded for peace just before the
Battle of Poitiers in 1356, supposedly “bowing very low to [John II], in all humility, and with his
hands joined as if in prayer, begged him, for the love of Almighty God, that he should delay and
hold back for a while.”190 Clergy and papal envoys would continue to serve at peace talks
throughout the 1370s and 1430s.191
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While the clergy did notably serve as mediators hoping for peace between the two
kingdoms, many men of the cloth also served to directly support the war effort of one of the two
kingdoms, often serving as sources of propaganda and divine justification. The door of the parish
church often served as a communal notice board, displaying genealogies and verses to stress the
birthright of whoever claimed to be the rightful king of France. 192 Edward III did this for years,
ordering clergymen to preach his reasons for going to war and his legitimacy to the throne of
France. 193 The practice of reminding people of great victories was also used, as shown when
Henry V ordered a chapel to commemorate the anniversary of his victory at Agincourt, thus
using the church to remind his subjects of his victory supposedly won through divine will. 194
More than simply posting written propaganda, the clergy served in a more direct role. This often
meant that clergy engaged in patriotic sermons delivered from the pulpit for all the church-going
civilians to hear.195 The Church thus became a mouthpiece for the king and a source of divine
legitimacy for his actions and conquest, and some would view this change with contempt.
Even the act of prayer itself, directed by priests, was seen as a way to contribute to the
war through asking for peace or victory. In 1412, the citizens and clergy of Paris from various
parishes organized processions of prayer and penance dedicated to bringing peace to France.196
Similarly, in 1443 the Bishop of Hereford, under orders of Henry VI, ordered prayers and
processions dedicated to bringing victory for the English against the French. 197 It is interesting to
note that the case of the Bishop of Hereford was organized by order of the king, rather than by
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any known desire of the Bishop, or the people themselves. This could reflect a growing sense of
subservience and obedience of the English clergy to the king, which will be discussed in greater
detail in the next section of this chapter.
Due to various incidents during the late 14th and early 15th centuries, most of which were
directly or indirectly caused by the Hundred Years War, the Church became significantly
weakened and faced having its power reduced to a secondary role under the European monarchs.
In 1378, the Great Schism saw two popes elected and two centers of papal authority established,
one in Rome and the other in Avignon, splitting the western Church and polarizing increasingly
strong attitudes to the Hundred Years War, as England and France were on opposite sides of the
Schism. 198 France and England thus sought to gain advantage in the Hundred Years War by
securing the papacy for their respective candidate, and the churchmen of the two kingdoms
increasingly found themselves in a position where they were forced to choose between the
demands of the “universal” Church and the demands of their kings. 199
Many clergymen saw their reputation suffer as a result of the Schism and the Hundred
Years war, facing criticism for their involvement in and failure to end either conflict. 200 This
called into question the authority and competence of the Church in matters political or
ecclesiastic, impeding and even setting back the progress made by popes in previous centuries to
impose Church authority in temporal matters. The wealth of the clergy was also reduced, as both
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England and France took substantial sums in direct taxes from the Church in order to support the
costs of the war and local defense. 201
As noted before, clergy came to be viewed with suspicion, often viewed as propaganda
machines and even spies. This can be seen in France in 1432 when the abbess of Saint Antoine in
Paris and some of her nuns were imprisoned when she was accused of plotting to betray the city,
and can also be seen in England in 1373 when the Commons in Parliament requested that no
French prior live close to the coast as “’they are French in their bodies and from time to time spy
upon the secrets and ordinances at parliaments and councils; and they send their spies and
messengers to their abbots and superiors in the realm of France.’” 202 This view and suspicion of
the clergy as tools of the kings increased the already unfavorable opinion of many lay people,
thus reducing the power and influence of the Church even further. It is not hard to understand
why this view of suspicion was held by so many, as clergymen were often used after conquest to
legitimize a claim and stabilize an occupied territory. The English did this extensively, as Henry
V did in Normandy when he ensured that the local clergy were well treated in an attempt to use
their influential status to shape the political and social attitudes of the communities and act as a
stabilizing force.203 This was again used during the occupation of Paris by English and
Burgundian forces when priests of every rank within the Church swore oaths of allegiance in
order to sustain the presence of the Anglo-Burgundians in the capital and control the political
behavior of the populace.204 With their seemingly constant shifts in loyalty and their perceived
status as political tools of monarchs over the course of the Hundred Years War, the view of the
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Church as a “universal” organization that could be completely trusted was diminished, and this
loss of trust and respect can be seen in the increasing attacks on churches and monasteries from
soldiers on both sides.205 In the process of this loss of power and influence, the English Church
in particular became divided from the rest of Europe. The character of worship, along with the
political and spiritual orientation of the English clergy began to change, with the churchmen
having to decide if their loyalty was ultimately to the pope or the king. 206 This would be the
beginning of the process through which the Church of England would be established during the
reign of Henry VIII, separate from the Catholic Church and subject to the authority of the king.
This would be just one of many long-term effects of the Hundred Years War, which will be
further discussed in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
The Hundred Years War left a strong and lasting impact on the societies of England and
France. The scars left by the Hundred Years War would either heal or fester depending on which
country is examined. France, despite enduring the overwhelming majority of the war’s
destruction, emerged as a stronger and more unified nation following its ultimate victory.
England, in contrast, was severely affected by the sting of defeat and fell into a civil war that put
a new house on the throne. In both countries, the war helped to give rise to a sense of
nationalism; a feeling of being separate and different from one another.
France
The majority of the war took place on French soil, and as a result France suffered the
worst physical effects of the war. However, it seems that France may have emerged from this
conflict stronger and more united than it had been previously. Conflict, especially conflict on
such a large scale over such a long period of time, inevitably unites people. This was assuredly
the case in France as it suffered from threats both within and without and was in dire need of a
solid, united defense that could push back those threats. This defense came thanks to the efforts
of the kings of France, who more and more frequently employed the “inclusiveness” of the word
“Francia” to describe the whole kingdom instead of just those areas under royal authority, in
addition to promoting the idea of a motherland with the king at its head promoting the common
good.207 The threat of external attack helped France begin to face said threats in a communal
way, and aided in the king’s establishment of the standing army, which was discussed in
previous chapters, along with the national fiscal system needed to support that army. The army
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owed its organization, pay, and above all its loyalty to the king, but was seen as a defender of the
French as a whole, making it an instrument of state and a symbol of French unity. 208 It was with
this army that the English were all but pushed out of France, with only Calais remaining in
English possession until 1558, and it was because of this ousting that the Valois monarchy was
able to expand its power into the “’natural’ geographical area of France,” and establish direct
royal control.209 Charles VII did much to further this, as his victories, conquests, and political
and administrative successes were seen as being divinely inspired, extending the power of the
French kingship and paving the way for the concept of ruling by divine right that would
constitute the power of future French kings.210 Thus, through these institutions, the French king
was able to secure more power over the French state as a whole and pave the way toward the
absolute monarchy of the early modern period.
England
In the end, despite its successes in the most famous battles of the war, England lost the
war along with most territory on the mainland of France. Above all it was the English monarchy
that appeared to lose the most because of the war, its claim to rule France repelled and its
prestige in the eyes of the English people severely weakened. 211 It was because of this that many
in England, especially those that had served in France, supported the ambitions of Richard, Duke
of York in his bid to be king. This series of conflicts over the English throne came to be known
as the Wars of the Roses, and although the English defeat in the Hundred Years War was not the

208

Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 148.
David Green, The Hundred Years War: A People’s History, (London: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 21.
210
Green, The Hundred Years War, 232.
211
Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 164.
209

76

only cause of the civil war, there is no doubt that it was a major factor.212 This civil war would
eventually end with the establishment of the Tudor dynasty, a dynasty that may not have taken
power were it not for the Hundred Years War and its outcome. Following this, the English were
forced to accept that the Angevin Empire was lost forever, and new imperial ambitions had to be
sought within the British Isles and, eventually, the New World.
While the monarchy of England did enjoy a certain upsurge in power as a result of the
war, especially after the bloody and exhaustive civil war that followed it, it was not on the same
scale as the French and was tempered with the eventual increase of the power of Parliament. This
was especially true of the Commons in the Parliament, who became increasingly aware of the
power and authority they possessed, and their ability to influence royal policy through the money
that Commons could grant for said policy. 213 Thus, England began to shift more and more
towards the limited monarchy that would characterize it in later years. England, just as France,
was beginning to resemble the nation that would be seen in the early modern era.
Nationalism
The Hundred Years War, in many ways, was a family squabble, Edward III believing that
his familial relations gave him a right to claim the throne of France. Given the history of the
rulers of England being descendents of the Duke of Normandy, a French nobleman, it could be
argued that for many centuries there was some semblance of unity or common ground between
the two nations, at least among the nobility. Following the Norman Conquest, Henry IV was the
first king of England who spoke English as his first language as opposed to French, and Henry V

212
213

Green, The Hundred Years War, 21.
Green, The Hundred Years War, 250.

77

was promoting the use of English for “political and nationalistic purposes,” so there were clearly
some commonalities for some time.214
It is then quite ironic that as the war went on, differences between the two kingdoms were
being pronounced and praised by their respective supporters, separating the opposing kingdom as
“them,” who are inferior to “us.” For instance, there was a popular verse in which the English
mocked the Flemish, who were French allies, which in one section states “And therefore, ye
Flemmynges, that Flemmynges ben named,/ To compare with Englissmen, ye aught be
ashamed!”215 Similarly, a French text which takes the form of a debate between an English and a
French herald, claims that the English only succeeded in achieving “great conquests” because
they attacked when the future Charles VII was still a child. But once Charles had grown, the tract
claims, he defeated and outperformed the English seemingly at every turn, “conquering in one
year all that [England] and your king Henry conquered in thirty three.” 216 Other evidence can be
seen in the French claiming the English as being “’arrogant’” and had come to France to steal the
French crown under false claims, while on the English side the French were seen as deceptive,
“’stiff-necked people,’” who had usurped said crown. 217 The language of these accusations,
especially those detailing the battles of the war, is quite different from the language of Froissart
or other chivalric writing traditions, as it gave little credit or honor to the enemy, and blanket
statements and beliefs, such as the English being king-killers or the French being effeminate,
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damned an entire nation in the eyes of another.218 In this way, a sense of separateness and
characteristics of one people being different from one’s own became recognized and fostered a
sense of national consciousness.
In later texts especially, one can see the growth of this national, united consciousness.
Charles VII’s conquest of Gascony was described by Monstrelet as a re-conquest of a territory
“’occupied by the English since time immemorial,’” thus giving a clear sense that there was a
French national identity that was in part determined by territorial location, which must be united
with the rest of the nation through Charles’s conquest.219 In was also during the Hundred Years
War, in 1422 to be exact, that the term “Mother France” was coined by Alain Chartier, which
served as a symbol of a single community made up of Frenchmen and women. 220 Similarly in
England, St. George became a symbol and rallying point for the English people, representing all
those that served the nation in any capacity. 221 Under these two symbols, the peoples of England
and France fought against one another and came to see themselves as distinct through borders
both physical and ideological, each one claiming superiority over the other.
In terms of historical analysis, nationalism may not be a discussed topic until a few more
centuries into the history of England and France, but it is difficult to deny that the roots of
nationalism within these two countries come from the Hundred Years War. Nationalism was
becoming “an increasingly positive sentiment which thrived upon war, and upon the feeling of
common commitment which war could generate,” and as was discussed previously, war came to
encompass nearly every area of society to the point where everyone, no matter what their station,
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was in some way caught up in the war.222 Nationalism was thus a mark of cohesion; of uniting
behind the war effort and supporting those that people felt were their family, being born from the
same “Mother” country, to fight against the enemy, the foreigner.
Conclusion
The Hundred Years War had an undeniable impact on English and French societies. The
monarchies of both kingdoms shifted and evolved to reflect a constitutional monarchy for
England and an absolute monarchy for France. In addition, the nobility of both kingdoms saw
their position within society as the primary military commanders and frontline cavalry soldiers
slowly erode as infantry came to dominate the battlefield and merit outweighed noble birth, but
at the same time opened up new opportunities to serve the state through administrative means.
With this increased emphasis on military experience and the benefits of a strong infantry, the
social hierarchies of England and France became less rigid as those of the lower nobility or
higher peasantry achieved status and riches based on their performance in battle. The classic
medieval army raised ad hoc by feudal obligations was all but abandoned in favor of a paid,
professional, and in the case of France, permanent army, which was outfitted with ever
improving military equipment that opened up even more opportunities for non-nobles to achieve
distinction based on their profession. War had become a profession, and the prevalence of
mercenary companies during this period helps to prove that, while also contributing to some of
the worst atrocities faced by the non-combatants. These non-combatants endured raids, murder,
requisitions, and taxes due to the war, and this in part led to a growing sense of importance that
led to their demanding of greater rights, sometimes through armed rebellion. But the non-
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combatant did not always suffer during the war, with some indeed prospering through their
professions serving the military in a non-combat role or through the selling of their wares to aid
in the war effort. Society thus became militarized and united in the conflict as every member was
involved in the war or aware of its progress. This in turn led to a growing national consciousness
among the populations of England and France that continued to grow after the war’s conclusion
and shape the two nations into the entities that would be seen in the early modern period
following the end of the Middle Ages.
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